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Martin R.F. Senft leben*
1. Introduction
Th e Dutch legal tradition in the fi eld of quotations, parody and fair use can 
provide important impulses for the further development of European and 
international copyright law. Given the fundamental importance of use privileges 
in this area for achieving copyright’s overall goal to support cultural follow-on 
innovation, these impulses may become particularly relevant when it comes to 
the question of adequate reactions to new forms of re-using and disseminating 
copyrighted material on the Internet, such as the re-use and dissemination of 
protected material in the context of enhanced search engine services and user-
generated content (section 2). Against this background, the development of the 
right of quotation, the exemption of parody and the debate on fair use under 
the 1912 Dutch Copyright Act will fi rst be analysed in more detail (section 3), 
before placing the insights from this analysis in the broader context of European 
copyright law (section 4). A fi nal assessment of the impulses that may be derived 
from the Dutch approach to quotations, parody and fair use concludes the 
analysis (section 5).
2. Core rationale and current challenges
2.1 Th eoretical foundation
Breathing space for quotations, parody and other transformations of copyrighted 
material is central to any copyright system. Th is becomes apparent the moment 
the grant of copyright protection is analysed from a functional perspective. On 
its merits, the ultimate aim of copyright can be seen in the furtherance of the 
* Martin R.F. Senft leben is professor at VU University Amsterdam and Senior Consultant at Th e Hague.
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cultural inspiration cycle.1 In all époques, new cultural productions have been 
inspired by and based upon pre-existing cultural material. Not surprisingly, 
copyright theory leaves room for the limitation of copyright protection for the 
purpose of supporting further acts of creation. From the perspective of utilitarian 
copyright theory, copyright protection is granted for a limited period of time 
to ensure a suffi  cient production of literary and artistic works for the overall 
welfare of society. Th e grant of protection is only a vehicle within this theoretical 
framework to ensure a reservoir of diverse cultural resources that can serve as a 
source of inspiration and basis for further acts of creation. By providing a rich 
cultural landscape, the protection system supports cultural follow-on innovation. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the natural rights approach 
to copyright law. Viewed from the author-centric natural rights perspective, the 
furtherance of creativity based on pre-existing works is a matter of solidarity 
among authors. Later authors ought to have the same freedom of using pre-
existing works as building blocks for new creations as was enjoyed by their 
predecessors.2 Th erefore, it is a primary goal of copyright to allow authors to 
build upon pre-existing works when embarking on the creation of a new literary 
or artistic work. In this way, copyright law ensures a constant cycle of cultural 
productions on the basis of already existing individual forms of expression.3 
Copyright law cannot attain this goal by simply providing for broad exclusive 
1 Cf. M.R.F. Senft leben, ‘Der kulturelle Imperativ des Urheberrechts’, in: M. Weller, N.B. Kemle, Th . Dreier 
(eds), Kunst im Markt – Kunst im Recht, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2010, p. 75. For a practical case raising 
the question of whether copyright law suffi  ciently supports cyclic innovation in the cultural sector, 
reference can be made to the problem of digital sound sampling. See German Federal Court of Justice, 
20 November 2008, case I ZR 112/06 (Metall auf Metall), GRUR 2009, p. 403, online available at www.
bundesgerichtshof.de; F.J. Dougherty, ‘RIP, MIX and BURN: Bemerkungen zu aktuellen Entwicklungen 
im Bereich des digitalen Sampling nach US-amerikanischem und internationalen Recht’, GRUR Int. 
2007, p. 481; D.M. Morrison, ‘Bridgeport Redux: Digital Sampling and Audience Recording’, Fordham 
Intellectual Property Media and Entertainment Law Journal 19 (2008), p. 75.
2 As to this concept of ‘intergenerational equity’ and its foundation in Locke’s theory of a natural right 
to property, see W.J. Gordon, ‘A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property’, Yale Law Journal 102 (1993), p. 1533 (1562-1564); M.R.F. Senft leben, 
Copyright, Limitations and the Th ree-Step Test – An Analysis of the Th ree-Step Test in International and 
EC Copyright Law, Th e Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law International 2004, p. 34-41.
3 In this sense already M.R.F. Senft leben, ‘Die Bedeutung der Schranken des Urheberrechts in der 
Informationsgesellschaft  und ihre Begrenzung durch den Dreistufentest’, in: R.M. Hilty, A. Peukert 
(eds), Interessenausgleich im Urheberrecht, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2004, p. 159. Cf. also N.W. Netanel, 
Copyright’s Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008; C. Geiger, ‘Copyright and the Freedom to 
Create – A Fragile Balance’, IIC 2007, p. 707 (722), who also emphasize the need to create breathing 
space for cultural follow-on innovation. With regard to the German theory of social responsibility 
accompanying the grant of intellectual property rights, see P. Kirchhof, Der Gesetzgebungsauft rag zum 
Schutz des geistigen Eigentums gegenüber modernen Vervielfältigungstechniken, Heidelberg: R. v. Decker 
und C.F. Müller 1988, p. 34-35; R. Kreile, ‘Die Sozialbindung des geistigen Eigentums’, in: P. Badura, R. 
Scholz (eds), Festschrift  für Peter Lerche zum 65. Geburtstag, München 1993, p. 257-258. 
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rights as an incentive for investment in new cultural productions. By contrast, 
the grant of protection must be counterbalanced by appropriate limitations that 
allow the use of protected material for the purpose of establishing new works. 
Only in this way, the system fully supports the overall goal of fostering cultural 
follow-on innovation. In continental-European copyright systems, the right of 
quotation and breathing space for parodies constitute inevitable counterbalances 
in this respect. Th e freedom to include quotations in own productions and the 
freedom to criticize pre-existing works in the guise of parody are fundamental 
user rights of authors that depend on the use of pre-existing material for 
expressing themselves. Th ese rights of use are fundamental also in the sense that 
they are supported by the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression and 
information.4 Th e right of quotation and the exemption of parodies are inevitable 
for reconciling copyright protection with freedom of speech.
In Anglo-American copyright systems, open-ended fair use provisions can be 
employed to establish an appropriate balance between copyright protection and 
freedom of expression. Th e most prominent example of an open-ended provision 
of this type – the US fair use doctrine refl ected in Section 107 of the US Copyright 
Act – guides the decision on whether an individual form of use can be deemed 
fair by providing four factors which shall be taken into account among other 
considerations that may be relevant in a given case:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for non-profi t educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the eff ect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.5
4 With regard to the impact of the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression on the copyright system, 
see E.J. Dommering, De achtervolging van Prometheus – over vrijheid en bezit van informatie, Amsterdam: 
Otto Cramwinckel 2008; C. Geiger, ‘“Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? Th e Infl uence of 
Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union’, IIC 37 (2006), p. 371; A. Strowel, 
F. Tulkens, D. Voorhoof (eds), Droit d’auteur et liberté d’expression, Brussels: Editions Larcier 2006; P.B. 
Hugenholtz, ‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe’, in: N. Elkin-Koren, N.W. Netanel (eds), Th e 
Commodifi cation of Information, Th e Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer 2002, p. 239; Th . Dreier, ‘Balancing 
Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or Outside of Proprietary Rights?’, in: R. Dreyfuss, D. 
Leenheer-Zimmerman, H. First (eds), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property. Innovation Policy 
for the Knowledge Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001, p. 295; S. Macciacchini, Urheberrecht 
und Meinungsfreiheit, Bern: Stämpfl i 2000; Y. Benkler, ‘Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain’, New York University Law Review 74 (1999), p. 355; N.W. 
Netanel, ‘Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society’, Yale Law Journal 106 (1996), p. 283.
5 See Section 107 of the US Copyright Act. Th e list is understood as an open, non-exclusive enumeration. 
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On the basis of this legislative framework and established case law, US courts 
conduct a case-by-case analysis in order to determine whether a given use can be 
exempted from the control of the copyright holder.6 Th e notion of transformative 
use traditionally constitutes a decisive factor in this context. In the famous parody 
case Campbell v. Acuff -Rose – about a rap version of Roy Orbison’s and William 
Dees’ song ‘Oh, Pretty Woman’ which the rap group 2 Live Crew had composed 
to satirize the intact world built up in the original –, the Supreme Court of the 
United States explained with regard to the fair use analysis: 
Th e central purpose of this investigation is to see […] whether the new 
work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation […] or instead 
adds something new, with a further purpose or diff erent character, altering 
the fi rst with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, 
whether and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative’.7
In comments on the fair use doctrine, the notion of transformative use is 
understood in the sense of productive use. Th e fair use must aim to employ the 
copyrighted matter in a diff erent manner or for a purpose diff erent from the 
original. Mere repackaging or republication is insuffi  cient. By contrast, a use 
adding value to the original, transforming the original in new information, new 
aesthetics, new insights and understandings, constitutes ‘the very type of activity 
that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.’8 Th e 
aim to support cultural follow-on innovation, therefore, lies at the core of the fair 
use doctrine.
Given the central importance of breathing space for quotations, parodies and 
See Senate and House Committee Reports, as quoted by L.E. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in 
Copyright – Th e Exclusive Rights Tensions in the 1976 Copyright Act, Cambridge (Massachusetts)/
London: Harvard University Press 1978, p. 19-20: ‘…since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, 
no generally applicable defi nition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its 
own facts… Th e bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use […] but 
there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute… Beyond a very broad statutory explanation 
of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine 
to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.’
6 Th e factors provide guidance for the application of the ‘equitable rule of reason’ which fair use 
represents. Cf. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), section IV.B. 
Additional factors may be taken into account. As to the application of the fair use doctrine in practice, 
see P.N. Leval, ‘Toward a Fair Use Standard’, Harvard Law Review 103 (1990), p. 1105 (1125-1130); J. Litman, 
‘Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Image’, University of Dayton Law Review 22 (1997), p. 588 
(612); D. Nimmer, ‘“Fairest of Th em All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use’, in: J. Boyle (ed.), ‘Law and 
Contemporary Problems’, Duke University Law Journal 66 (2003), p. 263.
7 Supreme Court of the United States of America, 7 March 1994, 510 U.S. 569 (Campbell v. Acuff -Rose), 
section A.
8 P.N. Leval, ‘Toward a Fair Use Standard’, Harvard Law Review 103 (1990), p. 1105 (1111). 
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other forms of transformative use for the proper functioning of the copyright 
system, it is of particular interest to analyse the development of use privileges in 
this core area under the 1912 Dutch Copyright Act.
2.2 Need for more fl exibility
Before turning to a more detailed analysis, however, it is to be noted that in the 
fi eld of quotations, parody and other transformations of existing material into 
new creations, the traditional continental-European approach to copyright 
limitations and exceptions becomes more and more questionable. Under the 
continental-European approach, use privileges are included in a closed catalogue 
of exceptions that are circumscribed narrowly and oft en interpreted restrictively 
by the courts.9 
Given the rapid development of communication technology, copyright 
systems with such a closed catalogue of narrowly circumscribed exceptions are 
in danger of becoming incapable of keeping pace with new modes of re-using 
and disseminating literary and artistic works. As other continental-European 
copyright systems, the Dutch closed catalogue of exceptions, for instance, fails to 
provide breathing space for the online dissemination of digitized orphan works10 
and the remix of protected material by amateur creators off ering user-generated 
content.11 In line with the traditional approach in civil law jurisdictions, the 
lawmaker would have to create additional use privileges for these purposes.12 
Given the constant advancement of technology, timely updates of copyright law, 
9 At the European level, see CJEU, 16 July 2009, case C-5/08 (Infopaq v. DDF), para. 56-57, online available 
at www.curia.eu. Confi rming this principle, the Court, however, also underlined the need to ensure the 
eff ectiveness of exceptions and limitations in CJEU, 4 October 2011, case C-403/08 (Football Association 
Premier League v. QC Leisure), para. 162-163; and 1 December 2011, case C-145/10 (Eva Maria Painer v. 
Standard VerlagsGmbH), para. 132-134.
10 As to the problem of orphan works in European copyright systems, see M. Elferink, A. Ringnalda, 
Digitale ontsluiting van historische archieven en verweesde werken, Amstelveen: deLex 2009; S. van 
Gompel, ‘Unlocking the Potential of Pre-Existing Content: How to Address the Issue of Orphan Works 
in Europe?’, IIC 38 (2007), p. 669; M.R.F. Senft leben, ‘Pacman forever – preservering van computergames’, 
AMI 2009, p. 221.
11 As to the phenomenon of user-generated content, see E. Lee, ‘Warming Up to User-Generated Content’, 
University of Illinois Law Review 2008 (5), p. 1459, available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116671; 
M. Knopp, ‘Fanfi ction – nutzergenerierte Inhalte und das Urheberrecht’, GRUR 2010, p. 28; N. Helberger, 
L. Guibault, E.H. Janssen, N.A.N.M. van Eijk, C. Angelopoulos, J.V.J. van Hoboken, Legal Aspects of 
User Created Content, Amsterdam: IViR 2009, available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499333.
12 With regard to current initiatives taken at EU level in the area of orphan works, see Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan 
Works, 24 May 2011, COM (2011) 289 fi nal, 2011/0136 (COD). However, as the Proposal is based on the 
requirement of a ‘diligent search’, it is unlikely to solve the problem satisfactorily. It would not facilitate 
mass digitization projects.
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however, constitute a major challenge for national lawmakers. Th is problem is 
aggravated in the case of harmonized EU copyright, the amendment of which 
requires an even longer legislative process at the European level.
Given these challenges, the need to apply existing limitations and exceptions 
fl exibly to bring new forms of creating and disseminating literary and artistic 
works within their ambit of operation has grown constantly in recent years. 
For instance, copyright law has to react adequately to enhanced search engine 
services using protected material, including images, to indicate contents 
available on the Internet. In this context, the question arises whether search 
results generated automatically by an Internet search engine can be qualifi ed as 
permissible quotations.13 Similarly, the online dissemination of user-generated 
content consisting of a remix of copyrighted works raises the question whether 
breathing space for user-generated content can be created with the same legal 
mechanisms that have traditionally been used to exempt parodies.14 Questions of 
this kind, fi nally, lead to the more fundamental issue whether the time is ripe for 
the introduction of a fl exible fair use clause in continental-European copyright 
systems.15 Arguably, a fair use approach would allow the courts to broaden and 
restrict existing limitations, and create new use privileges, on the basis of a case-
by-case analysis. 
Th ese questions ranging from the more fl exible application of existing 
limitations to the adoption of an open-ended fair use clause will be revisited in the 
course of the following analysis of the development of the right of quotation, the 
exemption of parody and the debate on fair use under the 1912 Dutch Copyright 
Act. 
13 Cf. Th . Dreier, ‘Th umbnails als Zitate? – Zur Reichweite von § 51 UrhG in der Informationsgesellschaft ’, 
in: U. Blaurock, J. Bornkamm, C. Kirchberg (eds), Festschrift  für Achim Krämer zum 70. Geburtstag, 
Berlin: De Gruyter 2009, p. 225.
14 As to the importance of breathing space for user-generated content, see OECD, ‘Participative Web: 
User-Created Content’, document DSTI/ICCP/IE(2006)7/Final, dated 12 April 2007, online available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/40/0,3746,en_2649_34223_39428648_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
15 Cf. M.R.F. Senft leben, ‘Fair Use in the Netherlands: A Renaissance?’, AMI 2009, p. 1, online available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563986; M.R.F. Senft leben, ‘Th e International Th ree-Step Test: A Model 
Provision for EC Fair Use Legislation’, Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and 
E-Commerce Law 1 (2010), p. 67, available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723867.
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3. Current and past regulation in the Dutch Copyright Act
3.1 Right of quotation
Th e scope of the quotation right in Dutch copyright law has gradually been 
broadened over the last 100 years. Until the 1972 amendment of the Dutch 
Copyright Act, Article 16 DCA set forth a provision exempting the inclusion 
of short parts of previously published literary, scientifi c or artistic works, and 
short articles or poems, in anthologies and other works serving educational or 
scientifi c purposes, as well as in announcements and reviews in newspapers and 
journals.16 Th e use privilege required the indication of the title of the work from 
which material had been taken, and the author’s name. It covered the inclusion of 
protected material in translation.17 
An early decision of the District Court of Den Bosch, dating back to 23 
July 1923, sheds light on the requirement of ‘short parts’. In a case concerning 
the inclusion of 16 pages from a novel consisting of 386 pages in an anthology 
intended for teaching, the court was satisfi ed that the taking did not exceed the 
limits of Article 16 DCA.18 Th e court arrived at this conclusion even though the 
pages taken from the novel constituted an entire chapter. It held the view that, 
given the indication of the work’s title and author in line with the requirements 
of Article 16 DCA, the taking of the short chapter was appropriate to inform 
the reader about the novel and convince her of the novel’s literary quality.19 In 
another case decided by the Court of Appeal of Den Bosch, the taking of four 
poems – all stemming from the same author – was deemed to remain within the 
limits of Article 16 DCA.20
As a result of the 1972 amendment of the Dutch Copyright Act, Article 16 
DCA was restructured. While subparagraph (a) of the amended provision dealt 
specifi cally with the inclusion of short parts of previously published works, or 
short articles or poems, in anthologies or other works evidently intended for 
educational or other scientifi c purposes (‘droit d’emprunt’), subparagraph (b) 
permitted the quotation of parts of previously published texts, in the original 
language or in translation, or musical works, and the inclusion of reproductions of 
previously published works of art, in connection with the text of an announcement, 
16 See the offi  cial overview document presenting diff erent versions of Article 16 DCA, Tweede Kamer 
1964-1965, 7877, Nr. 4 (Bijlage van de Memorie van Toelichting), p. 4.
17 Bijlage van de Memorie van Toelichting, ibid., p. 4.
18 District Court of Den Bosch, 23 July 1923, NJ 1924, p. 283-284 (Robbers v. Teulings’ Uitgeversmaatschappij). 
19 District Court of Den Bosch, ibid., p. 284.
20 Court of Appeal of Den Bosch, 20 May 1924, NJ 1925, p. 37.
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review, polemic discussion or scientifi c treatise (‘droit de citation’).21 Th e diff erent 
purposes combined in the earlier text of Article 16 DCA – the taking of protected 
material for educational and scientifi c purposes and the quotation in the context 
of an announcement or review – were thus separated. With this separation, the 
use for educational or other scientifi c purposes in accordance with sub (a) was 
made subject to the payment of equitable remuneration, whereas quotations in the 
sense of sub (b) remained free without any obligation of paying remuneration.22 
Th e adoption of a subparagraph dealing specifi cally with the right of 
quotation allowed the introduction of more specifi c requirements. In line with 
the 1972 amendment, quotations were permissible under the Dutch Copyright 
Act only if the number and extent of the quoted works remained within the 
limits of what was reasonably acceptable in accordance with the rules of social 
custom, the author’s moral rights were observed23 and, insofar as the author 
was indicated in the quoted work, the author’s name was indicated also in the 
context of the quotation.24 Some of these criteria have been developed further 
in later amendments. Under the current regulation of the quotation right in the 
Dutch Copyright Act, it is made a condition that the work quoted from has been 
published lawfully, the quotation is commensurate with what might reasonably 
be accepted in accordance with social custom and the number and extent of the 
quoted works is justifi ed by the intended purpose, the author’s moral rights are 
observed and, insofar as reasonably possible, the source, including the author’s 
name, is clearly indicated.25 
With the reference to the ‘rules of social custom’, the lawmaker in 1972 
intended to off er a fl exible guideline that could be applied to keep the number 
and extent of quotations within reasonable limits while not unduly restricting 
the right of quotation through the indication of a maximum number of words 
or lines. Th e primary purpose of quotations was described as ‘supporting and 
clarifying of what was argued’ in an announcement, review, polemic discussion 
or scientifi c treatise.26
21 See the offi  cial overview document presenting diff erent versions of Article 16 DCA, Tweede Kamer 
1964-1965, 7877, Nr. 4 (Bijlage van de Memorie van Toelichting), p. 4.
22 Th e separation of the two diff erent situations was particularly due to objections against the court 
practice of allowing rather substantial takings under Article 16 DCA even though the copyright owners 
were not remunerated for this use. See the offi  cial government documents explaining the amendments 
to the Dutch Copyright Act, Tweede Kamer 1964-1965, 7877, Nr. 3 (Memorie van Toelichting), p. 4. 
23 For a discussion of the moral rights recognized in the Dutch Copyright Act, see the contribution by A.A. 
Quaedvlieg and J.J.C. Kabel in Chapter 12 above.
24 With regard to this requirement, see District Court of Zutphen, 28 April 1981, BIE 1982, p. 182 (184), 
where a permissible quotation is denied because the source was not indicated.
25 Article 15a DCA.
26 See the offi  cial government document explaining the amendments to the quotation right, Tweede 
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In the case Zienderogen Kunst, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
applied the 1972 version of the Dutch quotation right to reproductions of art 
works included in a schoolbook. Th e newly drawn boundary line between the 
taking of protected material for educational and scientifi c purposes (sub (a)), 
and quotation in the context of announcements, reviews etc. (sub (b)), became 
particularly relevant in this case. Th e publisher Malmberg had distributed a 
schoolbook in which various works of art were reproduced in high quality. As 
these reproductions were unauthorized, the Dutch collecting society Stichting 
Beeldrecht sued for the payment of equitable remuneration. It took the view that 
the reproductions fell under the schoolbook privilege laid down in Article 16 sub 
(a) DCA, as in eff ect at that time. As explained above, Article 16 sub (a) DCA 
provided for the payment of equitable remuneration. To justify the unauthorized 
reproduction even though no remuneration had been paid, Malmberg invoked 
the right of quotation which, as delineated in Article 16 sub (b) DCA, did not 
oblige benefi ciaries to pay equitable remuneration.
Discussing the scope of the right of quotation, the Supreme Court elaborated 
that the right of quotation laid down in Article 16 sub (b) DCA only allowed 
an unauthorized taking which did not substantially impair the right holder’s 
interest in a work’s exploitation, as protected by copyright law.27 Seeking to 
concretize this formula, the Court held that the reproduction of a work of art 
had to be made subject to the text, with which it was connected, in such a way 
that it could no longer be regarded as a form of exploitation of the artistic work 
involved.28 Th e Court derived this standard from the international three-step test 
that had been enshrined in Article 9(2) BC at the 1967 Stockholm Conference 
for the Revision of the Berne Convention. Accordingly, it placed the national 
rules governing anthologies for teaching and quotations in an announcement 
or review in the context of the criteria set forth in the Berne three-step test, in 
particular the prohibition of a confl ict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
an unreasonable prejudice to the author’s legitimate interests.29
Th is focus on exploitation interests in the context of the right of quotation 
becomes understandable in the light of the separation of the rules governing 
anthologies for teaching in Article 16 sub (a) on the one hand, and quotations in 
announcements, reviews etc. in Article 16 sub (b) on the other hand. On its merits, 
the Supreme Court had to decide in Zienderogen Kunst whether the publisher had 
Kamer 1964-1965, 7877, Nr. 3 (Memorie van Toelichting), p. 5.
27 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 22 June 1990, NJ 1991, no. 268, para. 3.3.
28 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, ibid., para. 3.3.
29 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, ibid., para. 3.4. Cf. the case comment by H. Cohen Jehoram, AA 40 
(1991), p. 675 (678).
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to pay equitable remuneration.30 Denying the right of quotation did not mean 
that the schoolbook could no longer be marketed. It only meant that Malmberg 
would have to pay equitable remuneration. According to the facts established in 
the case, the high quality reproductions of art works featured prominently in the 
schoolbook, whereas the accompanying texts amounted to only one quarter of the 
publication. Against this background, the Supreme Court seems to have felt that 
the schoolbook was a hidden form of exploiting the art works, and that equitable 
remuneration should be paid. Th is result, however, could only be achieved by 
denying the existence of a permissible quotation. 
Given the specifi c conditions developed during the 1972 amendment of 
the quotation right – the need to justify the number and extent of quotations 
in the light of social custom, the context requirement of an announcement, 
review, polemic discussion or scientifi c treatise – it is nonetheless surprising 
that the Supreme Court introduced an exploitation test in the fi eld of the right of 
quotation instead of relying on these more specifi c criteria to deny a permissible 
quotation.31 As pointed out by Spoor in his case comment, it is diffi  cult to reconcile 
this development with the independent position held by the right of quotation in 
international copyright law.32 Th e right of quotation is explicitly recognized as a 
mandatory use privilege in Article 10(1) BC. In this context, an exploitation test 
can only be derived indirectly from the requirement of ‘fair practice’ that may 
be understood to prevent encroachments upon the exploitation of the original 
work.33 
As indicated by the Supreme Court itself, the importance attached to the 
international three-step test in Zienderogen Kunst was due to a reference to 
Article 9(2) BC during a further amendment of the Dutch Copyright Act that 
had already been adopted at the time the Supreme Court rendered its decision.34 
Admittedly, the international three-step test is nowadays applicable to all Berne 
limitations by virtue of Article 13 TRIPS and Article 10(2) WCT.35 Viewed from 
this perspective, the focus on exploitation interests in Zienderogen Kunst may 
appear less inconsistent – at least when the right of quotation in Article 10(1) BC 
30 Cf. the analysis by J.H. Spoor in his case comment, NJ 1991, no. 268, para. 4; M. De Zwaan, ‘Zeer apart. 
Een beoordeling van 10 jaar citaatrecht’, AMI 1995, p. 183 (188-189).
31 Cf. the case comment by E.J. Dommering, AMI 1990, p. 203 (205), where the application of the specifi c 
criteria established in the Dutch quotation right is discussed in more detail.
32 See the analysis by J.H. Spoor in his case comment, NJ 1991, no. 268, para. 5-7.
33 Cf. the case comment by H. Cohen Jehoram, AA 40 (1991), p. 675 (678).
34 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, ibid., para. 3.4.
35 Cf. the description of the diff erent functions of the international three-step test in Senft leben, Copyright, 
Limitations and the Th ree-Step Test, p. 121-124.
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is qualifi ed as a limitation falling under the international three-step test.36 Given 
the mandatory nature of Article 10(1) BC, the right of quotation may alternatively 
be seen as a right of use (of authors wishing to build upon pre-existing material) 
that does not fall within the scope of the three-step test.37
Th e 1985 amendment of the quotation right that infl uenced the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Zienderogen Kunst sought to bring the quotation right in the 
Dutch Copyright Act in line with Article 10(1) of the 1967 Stockholm/1971 Paris 
Act of the Berne Convention. As the revised text of the Convention, in contrast to 
the earlier Brussels Act, was no longer confi ned to quotations in newspapers and 
journals,38 the Dutch lawmaker laid down a general quotation right covering all 
categories of works in Article 15a(1) DCA.39 Following the Stockholm/Paris text, 
the requirement that the extent of a quotation should not ‘exceed that justifi ed 
by the purpose’ was added to the specifi c conditions for a permissible quotation. 
In Article 15a(2), the Dutch legislator explicitly pointed out that short works, as 
well as works of art, architecture, photography and applied art, may be quoted in 
their entirety. Th is permission to take the entire work was based on Article 9(2) 
BC even though the three-step test in this Berne provision only deals with acts of 
reproduction.40 Apparently, the Dutch lawmaker understood the three-step test 
in this context as a general rule adding further fl exibility to the quotation right 
refl ected in Article 10(1) of the Stockholm/Paris Act.
In literature, the establishment of a general right of quotation was welcomed. 
Nonetheless, the new, general provision was criticized because the Dutch 
lawmaker had broadened the scope of the quotation right only in terms of work 
categories falling under the use privilege. Th e traditional context requirement, 
however, had been upheld. Th e new Article 15a DCA still required the quotation 
to be made in the context of an ‘announcement, review, polemic discussion 
or scientifi c treatise’. With this confi nement to specifi c contexts, the Dutch 
implementation of the Stockholm/Paris text was more restrictive than the Berne 
Convention itself. In particular, it was felt that the new provision could not be 
invoked for the purpose of including references to protected pre-existing material 
36 In this sense already at the time of the Zienderogen Kunst decision H. Cohen Jehoram, ‘Opportuniteit of 
recht?’, AMI 1992, p. 63 (65).
37 For a theoretical foundation of this qualifi cation of the right of quotation, see Senft leben, ‘Der kulturelle 
Imperativ des Urheberrechts’, p. 75.
38 As a result of the earlier 1972 amendment, the Dutch Copyright Act contained a specifi c provision 
concerning newspaper and journal quotations in Article 15a. Th is provision refl ected the rules laid down 
in Article 10 of the Brussels Act of the Berne Convention.
39 See the offi  cial government document explaining the amendments to the quotation right, Tweede 
Kamer 1980-1981, 16 740, Nr. 3 (Memorie van Toelichting), p. 5-6.
40 Memorie van Toelichting, ibid., p. 6.
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in a new literary or artistic work that did not seek to announce or criticize the 
quoted material. Th e socially accepted practice of using quotations in works of 
literature, music or art remained outside the scope of the Dutch quotation right.41 
Considering the above-described function of copyright law to support the cultural 
innovation cycle, this argument must be taken particularly seriously. A quotation 
right failing to support cultural follow-on innovation because it is not designed as 
a right of later authors to use protected existing works as building blocks for new 
creations, is dysfunctional. Th e Dutch legislator, however, saw no need to legalize 
the socially accepted practice of references to protected pre-existing material in 
literary, musical and artistic works in the framework of the 1985 amendment.42
On the basis of the 1985 text, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands had the 
opportunity to revisit the exploitation test established in Zienderogen Kunst. In 
the case Damave v. Trouw, the Court had to decide on a review of the Dutch version 
of Th e Growing Pains of Adrian Mole that had appeared in the newspaper ‘Trouw’. 
Th e book review gave rise to legal action because it contained a reproduction 
of one (out of fi ve) book illustrations. Th e author of the illustrations, Damave, 
was of the opinion – in light of the earlier decision in Zienderogen Kunst – that 
the reproduction in the context of the book review amounted to an unjustifi ed 
exploitation of her work. Th e text of the book review referred to the illustrations 
only by pointing out that the Dutch translation contained ‘very unusual drawings 
by Henriette Damave’. Th e Trouw sought to defend the reproduction of the 
Damave drawing by invoking the right of quotation set forth in Article 15a DCA.
Discussing the scope of the quotation right in this context, the Supreme Court 
recalled its earlier ruling that the inclusion of a quotation may not encroach upon 
the exploitation interests of the copyright owner.43 However, the Court went on 
to explain that the inclusion of a book illustration, in principle, was permissible 
where the reproduction, together with the text of the review, served the purpose 
of giving the reader an adequate impression of the book concerned. While an 
explicit reference to the illustration in the text of the review could be relevant in 
this context, such reference was not decisive, as long as the connection between 
the text and the reproduction was suffi  ciently clear.44 A reproduction trespassed 
the limits of a permissible quotation, however, if it was brought into focus in such a 
41 P.B. Hugenholtz, Auteursrecht op informatie, Deventer: Kluwer 1989, p. 170. De Zwaan, ‘Zeer apart’, p. 183 
(186). Given this shortcoming of the 1985 amendment, A.A. Quaedvlieg, ‘De parodiërende nabootsing 
als een bijzondere vorm van geoorloofd citaat’, RM Th emis 1987, p. 279 (288), argued that the context 
requirement had no independent meaning. It was merely an enumeration illustrating the general 
principle that quotations were permissible.
42 See the offi  cial government statement quoted by De Zwaan, ibid., p. 186.
43 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 26 June 1992, NJ 1993, no. 205, para. 3.3.
44 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, ibid., para. 3.3.
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way that it predominantly obtained the function of a decoration of the newspaper 
or journal concerned.45 Applying these factors to the book review in Trouw, the 
Supreme Court was satisfi ed that the conditions for a permissible quotation in the 
sense of Article 15a DCA had been met. Th e reproduction of Damave’s drawing 
did not amount to copyright infringement.46
Th is further ruling of the Supreme Court on the quotation right is understood 
as a relaxation of, or even departure from, the exploitation test adopted in 
Zienderogen Kunst. Commenting on the decision, Quaedvlieg speaks of a ‘mild 
criterium’ applied in Damave v. Trouw. Instead of reinforcing the exploitation 
test, the Supreme Court asks whether the quotation is functional (in the sense that 
there is a suffi  cient connection with the text) and proportionate (in the sense that 
it is not used predominantly as a decoration).47 Th ese criteria seem to be inferred 
from the text of Article 15a DCA itself, such as the need to justify the number 
and extent of quotations in light of the intended purpose, instead of stemming 
from an assessment of the author’s exploitation interests.48 Th e reason for the 
development of milder criteria in Damave v. Trouw can be found in diff erent 
legal consequences. As pointed out above, the Supreme Court basically had to 
decide in Zienderogen Kunst whether the quotation right or the exception for 
educational anthologies was applicable. A restrictive approach to the quotation 
right only meant that the publisher Malmberg had to resort to the anthology 
exception instead and pay equitable remuneration for the use of the art works 
concerned. In Damave v. Trouw, an alternative defence besides the quotation 
right was unavailable. If the Supreme Court had denied a permissible quotation, 
copyright owners would have been in a position to prohibit the use of illustrations 
in book reviews altogether.49 
Interestingly, the decorative function had already been identifi ed much 
earlier in Dutch jurisprudence as an ultimate limit of the quotation right. In a 
judgment given in 1971, the District Court of Th e Hague had already held that the 
reproduction of the painting Portuguese Fishermen by René Margotton on the 
cover page of the journal ‘Gouden Uren’ could not be qualifi ed as a permissible 
quotation because it served as a decoration of the journal rather than functioning 
as a reference to the (positive) discussion of the painting in the journal.50
With the nuanced assessment of quoted material in Damave v. Trouw, the 
45 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, ibid., para. 3.3.
46 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, ibid., para. 3.4.
47 See the case comment by A.A. Quaedvlieg, IER 1992, no. 40, para. 2.
48 Cf. Quaedvlieg, ibid., para. 7.
49 See the analysis of the situation in the case comment by D.W.F. Verkade, NJ 1993, no. 205, para. 11.
50 District Court of Th e Hague, 29 December 1971, NJ 1972, no. 212 (Sabam v. Succes).
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Supreme Court paved the way for a more balanced application of the right 
of quotation that was no longer aligned with the exploitation interests of 
the copyright owner.51 Irrespective of this additional fl exibility, the Dutch 
lawmaker seized the opportunity to further broaden the quotation right in the 
framework of the implementation of the Information Society Directive. While 
the Dutch quotation right, as discussed above, traditionally was confi ned to 
use in an announcement, review, polemic discussion or scientifi c treatise, the 
corresponding exception prototype in Article 5(3)(d) of the Information Society 
Directive allows quotations from material already lawfully made available to 
the public, for purposes ‘such as’ criticism or review. Th e words ‘such as’ can 
be understood to indicate that criticism and review are merely examples of 
legitimate quotation purposes. In this line of reasoning, national policymakers 
enjoy the freedom of exempting quotations serving other, comparable purposes. 
Against this background, the Dutch lawmaker decided to attenuate the 
traditional context requirement.52 
As a result of the implementation of the Information Society Directive in 
2004, the Dutch quotation right, accordingly, is no longer confi ned to use in an 
announcement, review, polemic discussion or scientifi c treatise. It also covers use 
for a ‘comparable purpose’. With this extension, the Dutch lawmaker sought to 
clarify that a quotation ‘from or in a work of art, such as an image or sound 
quotation’ was possible.53 Hence, the socially accepted practice of using quotations 
in works of literature, music or art that had remained outside the scope of the 
quotation right during the previous 1985 amendment fi nally made its way into 
the law.54 With the 2004 amendment, the Dutch quotation right became a right 
of later authors to use protected pre-existing works as building blocks for new 
creations. Doubt about this interpretation may arise from further statements 
made during the legislative process that indicate a need to confi ne legitimate 
purposes in the sense of the quotation right to those comparable with criticism or 
review.55 However, an author including a quotation from pre-existing material in 
her own work will normally do so to make a statement on the included material. 
51 See the Damave v. Trouw case comment by A.A. Quaedvlieg, IER 1992, no. 40, para. 7-8.
52 See the offi  cial government document explaining the amendment of the quotation right in the 
framework of the implementation of the Information Society Directive, Tweede Kamer 2001-2002, 28 
482, Nr. 3 (Memorie van Toelichting), p. 40.
53 Memorie van Toelichting, ibid., p. 40.
54 Cf. with regard to the discussion about these literary and artistic forms of quotation De Zwaan, ‘Zeer 
apart’, p. 183 (186); Quaedvlieg, ‘De parodiërende nabootsing als een bijzondere vorm van geoorloofd 
citaat’, p. 279 (288).
55 See the emphasis laid on the draft ing history by D.J.G. Visser, ‘De Auteurswet gewijzigd: Artikel 15a 
Aw (citaatrecht)’, AMI 2005, p. 132 (132); J.H. Spoor, D.W.F. Verkade, D.J.G. Visser, Auteursrecht, 3rd ed., 
Deventer: Kluwer 2005, p. 242 (footnote 127).
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Th erefore, even a strict requirement of comparability with criticism or review is 
not necessarily an insurmountable hurdle. 
In court practice, the 2004 amendment of the quotation right led to a remarkable 
development concerning automatically generated quotations.56 Considering the 
relaxation of the traditional context requirement, the Court of Appeals of Arnhem 
concluded, in a case concerning a search engine collecting information from 
online databases of housing agencies, that the broadened quotation right could 
be invoked with regard to search results produced by Internet search engines. 
Th e ‘Zoekallehuizen.nl’ search engine for the housing market displayed a small 
picture thumbnail of houses or apartments relevant to the search request, the fi rst 
lines of the description of the houses or apartments concerned, and information 
about the address, price and the agent involved. Via a deep link, Zoekallehuizen.
nl indicated the source website from which the material had been taken. In the 
court’s view, these search results ‘announced’ the contents of underlying source 
websites. With criticism or review no longer being a prerequisite, or at least no 
longer being decisive, the court qualifi ed the search results as an expression that 
was comparable to traditional forms of quotation.57 Th e court was satisfi ed that 
Zoekallehuizen.nl had not taken more material than necessary to enable users to 
fi nd potentially relevant housing off ers on the Internet.
In a similar case that arose aft er the ruling in Zoekallehuizen.nl, the District 
Court of Alkmaar agreed that for the quotation right to apply, the reproduction 
and communication to the public of collected data had to be kept within the limits 
of what was necessary to give a good impression of the housing off er concerned.58 
Th e court specifi ed that under this standard, it was permissible to provide search 
engine users with a description of up to 155 characters, address and rent details, 
and one single picture thumbnail not exceeding the format of 194 x 145 pixels.59 
On balance, it can be concluded that the quotation right in the Dutch 
Copyright Act became a relatively fl exible instrument during the last 100 years. 
In Damave v. Trouw, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands adopted mild criteria 
for the assessment of the function and extent of quoted material. Implementing 
the Information Society Directive, the Dutch legislator attenuated the traditional 
56 For a more detailed discussion of this development, see D.J.G. Visser, ‘Doorzoekalledatabanken.nl – 
Enkele opmerkingen over zoekmachines, open-content-databanken, auteursrecht en databankenrecht’, 
in: N.A.N.M. van Eijk, P.B. Hugenholtz (eds), Dommering-bundel, Amsterdam: Otto Cramwinckel 2008, 
p. 359.
57 Court of Appeals of Arnhem, 4 July 2006, AMI 2007, p. 93.
58 District Court of Alkmaar, 7 August 2007, AMI 2007, p. 148 (Baas in Eigen Huis v. Plazacasa). On 
procedural grounds, the judgment has been annulled by the Court of Appeals of Amsterdam, 13 
December 2007, case no. LJN BC0125, online available at www.rechtspraak.nl.
59 District Court of Alkmaar, ibid., para. 4.14.
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context requirement confi ning the scope of the quotation right to use in an 
‘announcement, review, polemic discussion or scientifi c treatise’. In recent 
years, Dutch courts commenced applying the quotation right to online search 
results generated on the basis of an automated process of collecting and indexing 
information available on the Internet. 
Th e Dutch quotation right has thus been adapted to the new era of text and 
data mining in the digital environment. While this development may be seen 
as a departure from the classical meaning of ‘quotation’ that can be described 
as a ‘material reference back to the quoted work in the form of a description, 
commentary or analysis’,60 it must be emphasized that the evolution of a more 
fl exible standard – capable of keeping pace with new technologies and new, 
automated forms of quoting copyrighted material – strengthens the role of the 
right of quotation as a means of securing a proper balance between copyright 
protection and freedom of expression and information in the digital environment.
3.2 Limitations for parody
Prior to the implementation of the Information Society Directive, the Dutch 
Copyright Act did not contain an explicit exception for the purpose of parody. 
Nonetheless, Dutch copyright law off ered breathing space in this area. As 
explained in the chapter on the hybrid Dutch concept of ‘verveelvoudigen’,61 
the right of adaptation granted in Article 13 DCA does not cover adaptations 
constituting ‘a new, original work’. Th erefore, parodies that can be regarded as 
adaptations of this latter type – adaptations constituting a new, original work – 
remain free, even in the absence of a specifi c parody exception.
Th is mechanism for providing breathing space for parody can be found in 
other European jurisdictions as well. Th e German Copyright Act, for instance, 
contains a free use principle exempting adaptations that constitute ‘independent 
works’.62 Adaptations falling under this free adaptation rule are immune against 
copyright claims brought by the copyright owner whose work served as a basis 
for the adaptation. Traditionally, German copyright law creates room for parody 
in this way.63
60 In this sense still Advocate-General Trstenjak, Opinion in CJEU, case C-145/10 (Eva Maria Painer v. 
Standard VerlagsGmbH), 12 April 2011, online available at www.curia.eu, para. 210.
61 See Chapter 8 by Jaap Spoor, above. 
62 § 24 German Copyright Act. For an overview of German case law, see G. Schulze, in: Th . Dreier, G. 
Schulze, Urheberrechtsgesetz – Kommentar, 3rd ed., Munich: C.H. Beck 2008, p. 365-366.
63 For a recent discussion of this free use privilege against the background of international obligations, see 
P.E. Geller, ‘A German Approach to Fair Use: Test Cases for TRIPs Criteria for Copyright Limitations?’, 
Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 57 (2010), p. 901.
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In both cases – the ‘new, original work’ exemption in the Dutch Copyright 
Act and the ‘independent work’ exemption under German copyright law – the 
question becomes crucial which criteria are applied to identify those parodies 
that can be deemed a free adaptation keeping a suffi  cient distance from the 
underlying original work. Th is question is delicate because the parodist must 
necessarily include certain individual features of the original work in her 
adaptation. Otherwise, the object of the mockery will remain unidentifi able. Th e 
parody would become pointless.
In Dutch literature, it has been proposed to solve this dilemma by determining 
whether the contrast with the original work created through the parody outweighs 
the taking of individual copyrighted features. In this line of argument, it would 
be particularly relevant that, instead of simply imitating the original work, the 
inclusion of copyrighted features contributes to the sharp contrast required for 
a successful parody.64 Th e Supreme Court of the Netherlands, however, did not 
adopt a comparable standard for the identifi cation of free parodies. In the Suske 
en Wiske case, dating back to 1984, the Court had to decide on the use of drawings 
identical to the characters of the comic series Suske en Wiske. Without prior 
authorization, Verkuil had included drawings of Suske, Wiske, Lambiek, aunt 
Sidonia and Jerom in his own comic strips placing these characters in a diff erent 
context through stories and dialogues that, in contrast to the original Suske en 
Wiske strips, were of a violent or pornographic nature. Scriptoria – the owner 
of copyright to the comic characters – argued that the Verkuil comics infringed 
its copyright. Verkuil advanced the counterargument that the comic strips 
constituted parodies and that the taking of the original drawings was necessary 
to make the target of his mockery identifi able.65
Assessing these arguments, the Supreme Court confi rmed the view expressed 
in the earlier judgment of the Court of Appeal that in the case of a parody even 
a far-reaching degree of copying was permissible if and insofar as the copying 
was necessary to make the original work identifi able and clarify that the own 
work was a parody. As the Court of Appeal had established that the drawings 
used by Verkuil were almost identical copies of the original comic characters, 
the Supreme Court recalled that against this factual background, the Court of 
Appeal had concluded that the taking of protected material by Verkuil went far 
beyond what was necessary for the purpose of making a parody. In the case of 
well-known comic characters, very little was necessary to call them to mind. Th e 
64 In this sense particularly J.H. Spoor, D.W.F. Verkade, D.J.G. Visser, Auteursrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 1985, 
p. 114-115 and in later editions (2nd ed. 1993, p. 152; 3rd ed. 2005, p. 293).
65 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 13 April 1984, NJ 1984, no. 524 (Suske en Wiske), para. 1.
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Supreme Court, therefore, confi rmed the earlier ruling of the Court of Appeal 
that Verkuil had infringed copyright.66 
In literature, the application of a necessity test in parody cases – allowing only 
the taking of those features necessary to make the original work identifi able – 
was criticized for being too restrictive.67 Th e limits following from the necessity 
test came to the fore, for instance, in Bisdom Utrecht v. Beeldrecht. In this case, 
the Diocese of Utrecht had based an advertising campaign on Barnett Newman’s 
painting Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue III. In 1988, this painting had 
become the object of art vandalism. A mentally deranged man cut the painting 
with a stanley knife. Th e restoration took several years. Alluding to this act of 
art vandalism, the Diocese of Utrecht used a poster for its campaign with the 
same colours and colour proportions showing a cross carved into the painting’s 
central red area. Alluding also to the title, the campaign asked ‘Who’s Afraid of 
God?’. Given this unauthorized copying and distribution of Newman’s painting, 
Stichting Beeldrecht – a Dutch collecting society for visual artists and architects – 
sued the Diocese for copyright infringement. Confronted with copyright claims, 
the Diocese modifi ed its campaign and replaced the fi rst poster with a second 
one presenting the central red area of the painting in diff erent proportions and 
using green and light blue instead of the shades of yellow and blue in the original 
painting.68 
To defend the unauthorized use of Newman’s painting, the Diocese of Utrecht 
argued that the posters constituted new, original works and had to be qualifi ed 
as permissible parodies against this background. Scrutinizing this argument 
in the light of the necessity test adopted by the Supreme Court in the Suske en 
Wiske case, the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam held the view that even if the fi rst 
poster was qualifi ed as a parody alluding to Newman’s painting as an object of art 
vandalism, the Diocese had taken more than necessary for making the original 
work identifi able. Th e fi rst poster constituted an almost identical copy that was 
impermissible under the necessity test.69 In the second poster, by contrast, the 
taking from the original work was confi ned to those features necessary to call to 
mind Newman’s painting. Th e second poster, therefore, passed the test and was 
qualifi ed as a permissible parody by the court.70
66 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, ibid., para. 3.3.
67 Cf. Quaedvlieg, ‘De parodiërende nabootsing als een bijzondere vorm van geoorloofd citaat’, p. 279; 
R.J.Q. Klomp, ‘Recht op parodie’, in: J.M. van Buren-Dee, e.a. (ed.), Privaatrecht en Gros, Grosheide-
bundel, Antwerpen/Groningen: Intersentia 1999, p. 253.
68 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 6 August 1998, Informatierecht/AMI 1998, p. 136 (Bisdom Utrecht v. 
Stichting Beeldrecht), para. 4.7 and 4.12. 
69 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.8.
70 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.12.
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As pointed out in case comments, it is doubtful whether the posters used by 
the Diocese of Utrecht constituted parodies at all. Instead of ridiculing Newman’s 
painting as such, the poster campaign merely referred to the related acts of art 
vandalism.71 Nonetheless, the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam 
illustrates the restrictions imposed by the necessity test. Th e parodist does not 
enjoy the freedom of playing with all features of the original work. By contrast, she 
is bound to confi ne her taking to those elements necessary for the identifi cation of 
the original. Th e impact of this restriction on the parody genre – grounded in the 
ironic play with the individual features of the work being targeted – must not be 
underestimated. Besides the restriction with regard to the material available for 
the parodist, the necessity test is not unlikely to have a deterrent eff ect because of 
its vagueness and unpredictability. Parodists may not dare to express themselves 
because of the legal uncertainty surrounding the requirement of keeping within 
the limits of what is necessary to make the original work identifi able.72
Seeking to provide a fi rmer basis for parodies, Quaedvlieg argued for the 
qualifi cation of parodies as permissible quotations.73 In this way, the right of 
quotation would become available as a defence in parody cases. In fact, parodies 
can be regarded as a specifi c form of ‘criticism or review’. Th e critical comment 
is expressed in the guise of a mockery. Quaedvlieg’s argument does not lack 
power of persuasion in the context of the right of quotation recognized in the 
Dutch Copyright Act. As explained above, the Dutch quotation right covers 
not only announcements and review but also polemic discussions and scientifi c 
treatises. Against this background, Quaedvlieg was right in assuming that the 
confrontation of the original work with the parodist’s artistic reaction was 
comparable with the confrontation of the original work with the rationalist 
reaction of the polemist.74 Practically speaking, the qualifi cation of parodies as 
a specifi c from of quotation has the advantage of no longer requiring a showing 
that the parody constitutes a new, original work in the sense that it does not take 
more than necessary for identifying the original work.75 Th is would substantially 
reduce the legal uncertainty caused by the necessity test.
71 See the case comments by A.A. Quaedvlieg, Informatierecht/AMI 1998, p. 137 (138), and F.W. Grosheide, 
IER 1998, no. 47, para. 5, D.J.G. Visser, Mediaforum 1998, p. 266 (266). 
72 See the case comment by Visser, ibid., p. 266, and the example of ‘Kuifj e’ parodies that were fi nally 
frustrated by the legal uncertainty about the scope of the parody exemption that is given by Klomp, ‘Recht 
op parodie’, p. 253 (258). Cf. also J.J.C. Kabel, ‘Auteursrechtelijke grenzen aan de vrijheid van de beeldende 
kunstenaar’, in: T. Pronk, G.A.I. Schuijt (ed.), Hoe vrij is kunst?, Amsterdam: Otto Cramwinckel 1992, 
p. 68, with regard to insuffi  cient breathing space for appropriation art that also involves substantial 
copying of the original work.
73 Quaedvlieg, ‘De parodiërende nabootsing als een bijzondere vorm van geoorloofd citaat’, p. 279.
74 Quaedvlieg, ibid., p. 285.
75 Quaedvlieg, ibid., p. 288.
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In the case Rowling v. Byblos, however, the quotation argument failed. Th e 
case concerned the children’s book Tanja Grotter and the Magical Contrabass 
written by the Russian writer Dimitri Yemets. Byblos was about to launch the 
Tanja Grotter book on the Dutch market in translation. In Byblos’ book catalogue, 
Tanja Grotter was presented as the Russian sister of the famous Harry Potter.76 
Th ere was little doubt that the Tanja Grotter book leaned heavily on Harry Potter 
and the Sorcerer’s Stone. Comparing the story line, the setting of the respective 
wizard schools, the characters involved, the plot and the diff erent events in the 
book, the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam arrived at the conclusion that the 
impression given by Tanja Grotter and the Magical Contrabass was identical to 
the underlying Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone in too many respects. For 
this reason, the Tanja Grotter book could not be deemed a new, original work.77 
In this context, the court also devoted attention to the right of quotation that 
had been invoked as an additional defence by Byblos. Weighing this argument, 
the court observed that the writing of an entire children’s book based on Harry 
Potter could hardly be deemed an appropriate way of quoting Rowling’s work. 
Th e Tanja Grotter book as a whole could not be qualifi ed as a polemic discussion 
in the sense of the Dutch right of quotation.78 Th erefore, the quotation argument 
was rejected. A lawsuit about the rewriting of an entire novel, however, is not 
necessarily the most appropriate test case for Quaedvlieg’s quotation argument. It 
would be premature to cast doubt upon the applicability of the right of quotation 
in the light of the outcome of this particular case.
At the international level, Quaedvlieg’s argument is of particular importance 
because the right of quotation embodied in Article 10(1) BC is the only mandatory 
exception recognized in international copyright law. According to Article 10(1) 
BC, ‘[i]t shall be permissible to make quotations from a work…’ Th e prevailing 
French text79 reads ‘[s]ont licites les citations tirées d’une œuvre…’ Bringing 
parody within the scope of the right of quotation, therefore, strengthens the 
position of the parody defence internationally. As an important instance where 
pre-existing material is productively used as a basis for new creations, and an 
exception that is strongly supported by the fundamental guarantee of freedom of 
expression, it is consistent to let parody share the mandatory nature of the right 
of quotation at the international level.
In the Netherlands, the quotation argument lost its importance with the 
76 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 6 November 2003, AMI 2004, p. 37 (Rowling v. Byblos), para. 4.1.
77 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.7.3. For a detailed analysis of the judgment, see R.J.Q. 
Klomp, ‘Potter tegen Grotter, parodie of plagiaat?’, AA 53 (2004), p. 112.
78 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.7.7.
79 Article 37(1)(c) BC.
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implementation of the Information Society Directive. As already indicated 
above, the implementation led to the introduction of a specifi c exception for 
caricature, parody and pastiche modelled on Article 5(3)(k) of the Directive. Th e 
new Article 18b DCA exempts the use of copyrighted material ‘in the context of a 
caricature, parody or pastiche, provided the use is in accordance with what social 
custom regards as reasonably acceptable.’ With this specifi c exception, the Dutch 
lawmaker sought to enhance the breathing space for parody that had remained 
limited under the Suske en Wiske necessity test. During the legislative process, 
it was pointed out that in the light of the development of culture and freedom 
of expression, it would be inconsistent to allow copyright owners to frustrate 
the mockery of a parody that was made with a humorous intention.80 For the 
further development of the new exception, the courts could rely on jurisprudence 
in countries that provided for a specifi c parody exception already prior to the 
Information Society Directive, such as France, Belgium and Spain.81 As to the 
criteria to be applied, the humorous intention, the absence of the aim to compete 
with the original work and the absence of a risk of confusion were mentioned 
during the legislative process.82
Before the new parody exception entered into force in 2004, the draft 
legislation already had a mitigating eff ect on the traditional, rather strict 
assessment of parodies. In the case Bassy III, the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam 
had to decide on a parody concerning the good and naive clown Bassie and his 
more experienced friend Adriaan – characters of the children’s TV programme 
Bassie & Adriaan. In the fi lm Bassy III, these characters were placed in a violent 
context through a blend with Rocky fi lms.83 Although Bassy III imitated various 
features of the original children’s programme, the court found that, given the 
violent story, the use of strong language and the combination with elements from 
the Rocky series, Bassy III constituted a new, original work. Consequently, it was a 
permissible parody. Th e contrast with the original Bassie and Adriaan characters 
achieved through the totally diff erent context chosen for the parody ensured a 
suffi  cient distance from the original work.84 
Th e court came to this conclusion noting that the characters in Bassy III used 
80 See the offi  cial government document explaining the implementation of the Information Society 
Directive, Tweede Kamer 2001-2002, 28 482, Nr. 3 (Memorie van Toelichting), p. 53.
81 With regard to the situation in Belgium, see D. Voorhoof, ‘België: de paradoxen van de parodie’, in: F.W. 
Grosheide (ed.), Parodie – parodie en kunstcitaat, Th e Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2006, p. 123.
82 Memorie van Toelichting, ibid., p. 53.
83 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 30 January 2003, AMI 2003, p. 94 (Van Toor v. Phanta vision), 
para. 4.13.
84 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.10.
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almost identical names, clothing and hair styling.85 A parallel with the Suske 
en Wiske case, where the comic characters Suske and Wiske were placed in a 
violent or pornographic context, can easily be drawn against this background. 
In contrast to the Suske en Wiske judgment, the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 
however, emphasized the distance from the original work that was the result of the 
violent setting, instead of focusing on the imitation of individual features of the 
original Bassie and Adriaan characters. Referring to the pending implementation 
of the parody exception from the Information Society Directive, the court added 
that Bassy III was aimed at a market that was totally diff erent from the market 
for children’s entertainment.86 Th is latter consideration recalls the criterion of 
absence of the aim to compete with the original work that was mentioned during 
the legislative process leading to the adoption of the parody exception in Article 
18b DCA.
Decisions aft er the implementation of the Information Society Directive 
confi rm the evolution of a more liberal approach under the new parody exception. 
In Mercis and Bruna v. Punt, the publisher Mercis and Dick Bruna – author of 
the famous Dutch character ‘Miff y’ used for toys, children’s books and clothing – 
asserted copyright against the imitation of the Miff y drawings in parodies placing 
Miff y in completely diff erent contexts, including the presentation of Miff y as a 
terrorist.87 Referring to the strong contrast following from the contexts chosen 
for the parodies and the underlying evidently humorous and ironical intention, 
the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam concluded that the Miff y imitations had to 
be qualifi ed as permissible parodies in the sense of Article 18b DCA.88 Th e taking 
of individual features of the Miff y drawing was not decisive. Due to the distance 
created through the contrast with the original Miff y world, the parodies could 
not be regarded as a simple copy. According to the court, it was irrelevant in 
this regard that the parodies would not be perceived as funny by everybody.89 
Application of the parody exception in Article 18b DCA, moreover, implied that 
Bruna could not invoke his moral rights against the Miff y imitations.90
With the implementation of the Information Society Directive, a fl exible 
parody defence was therefore introduced in the Dutch Copyright Act. In 
particular, the specifi c exception enhances the room for the making of parodies 
when compared with the earlier exemption of parodies based on the inquiry 
85 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.11.
86 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.14.
87 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 13 September 2011, case LJN BS7825, online available at www.
rechtspraak.nl (Mercis and Bruna v. Punt), para. 4.1. 
88 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.13.
89 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.13.
90 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.16.
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whether the parody includes more features from the original work than necessary 
for identifying the target of the mockery.91 As in the case of the right of quotation, 
the implementation of the Information Society Directive, therefore, led to the 
broadening of the use privilege in Dutch copyright law. Under the new parody 
exception, Dutch courts are not unlikely to attach particular importance to 
the contrast resulting from the presentation of the individual features of the 
original work in a diff erent context. Th is focus on the contrast created by the 
parody is in line with the criteria proposed in Dutch literature already before the 
implementation of the Directive.92 
3.3 Evolution of a Dutch fair use doctrine
In principle, the regulation of copyright exceptions in the Netherlands follows 
the traditional continental-European model. Chapter I, § 6 of the Dutch 
Copyright Act enumerates individual cases of permissible unauthorized use 
that are circumscribed narrowly. As indicated above, this continental-European 
approach becomes more and more questionable in the information society. Given 
the rapid development of communication technology, copyright systems with a 
closed catalogue of narrowly circumscribed exceptions are rendered incapable 
of keeping pace with new modes of disseminating and re-using literary and 
artistic works. Given the constant advancement of technology, timely updates 
of copyright law constitute a major challenge for national lawmakers. Th e 
harmonization of copyright law in the EU has added an additional, complex and 
lengthy legislative cycle. Th e total legislative response time to a new technological 
development may well exceed ten years.93 Reactions to the constant challenges of 
information technology are thus likely to come too late.
Considering this dilemma, it is remarkable that the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands, as early as 1995, sought to open up the closed catalogue of exceptions 
in the Dutch Copyright Act and pave the way for more fl exibility that would allow 
the adequate balancing of interests in the light of new developments in the area of 
copyright law.94 In the national Dior v. Evora decision preceding the judgment of 
91 Cf. M. de Cock-Buning, ‘De parodie-exceptie nader beschouwd’, in: F.W. Grosheide (ed.), Parodie 
– parodie en kunstcitaat, Th e Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2006, p. 103 (105-119).
92 For instance, the contrast resulting from the parody was emphasized by J.H. Spoor/D.W.F. 
Verkade/D.J.G. Visser already in the fi rst edition of Auteursrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 1985, p. 114-115.
93 See the analysis by M. van Eechoud et al., Harmonizing European Copyright Law. Th e Challenges of 
Better Lawmaking, Th e Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law International 2009, p. 298.
94 With regard to the general need for enhanced fl exibility, cf. C. Geiger, ‘Flexibilising Copyright – 
Remedies to the Privatisation of Information by Copyright Law’, IIC 39 (2008), p. 178.
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the European Court of Justice,95 the Supreme Court of the Netherlands identifi ed 
the following room for the creation of additional breathing space within the 
Dutch system of exceptions:
In § 6 of Chapter 1 of the Dutch Copyright Act, several exceptions to 
copyright are enumerated which, as a general rule, are based on a balancing 
of the interests of copyright owners against social or economic interests 
of third parties or against the public interest. However, these explicit 
exceptions do not exclude the possibility that the limits of copyright must 
also be determined more closely in other cases on the basis of a comparable 
balancing of interests, in particular when the lawmaker was not aware of 
the need for the limitation concerned and the latter fi ts in the system of 
the law – this in the light of the development of copyright as a means of 
protecting commercial interests. For the required balancing of interests, 
one or more of the exceptions enumerated in the law can be used as a 
reference point.96
Th e case concerned the advertising of parallel imports of Dior perfumes sold 
in Kruidvat drugstores owned by Evora. Given the presentation of the luxury 
perfumes in regular Kruidvat advertising brochures, Dior was concerned about 
potential negative eff ects on its prestigious brand image. It asserted cumulative 
copyright and trademark protection relating to the perfume packaging and bottles 
to stop the advertising and shield its exclusive distribution network of offi  cial Dior 
dealers. Noting that the copyright on the packaging and bottles was exhausted 
aft er the fi rst sale under Dior’s control, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
expressed the view that Dior’s interest in copyright as a weapon against further 
reproduction and distribution in the context of advertising did not have much 
weight.97 Th e Court drew a parallel between this situation and the catalogue 
exception in Article 23 DCA which allows the owner of a work of (applied) art 
to include the work in a catalogue necessary for a public exhibition or sale. 
Considering the preference given to the interest in the unauthorized inclusion 
of an artistic work in an exhibition or sale catalogue, the Court concluded that 
in principle, Evora’s interest in the advertising of the resale of Dior perfume in 
the Netherlands also had to prevail. However, Evora had to observe Dior’s moral 
rights. Moreover, the advertising of parallel imports would be unacceptable if 
95 ECJ, 4 November 1997, case C-337/95 (Dior v. Evora), online available at www.curia.eu.
96 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 20 October 1995, NJ 1996, no. 682 (Dior v. Evora), para. 3.6.2 
(translation by the author).
97 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, ibid., para. 3.6.2.
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it took place under circumstances that could be detrimental to the copyright 
owner. Harm could fl ow, for instance, from the way in which Evora advertised 
the sale of Dior products.98 
In contrast to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, the European Court of 
Justice contented itself with a reference to earlier case law, according to which an 
exhausted copyright could not be relied on to prevent or restrict the importation 
of protected works which had been lawfully marketed in another EU member 
state.99 Th e Court held that the protection conferred by copyright as regards the 
reproduction of protected works in a reseller’s advertising may not, in any event, 
be broader than that which was conferred on a trademark owner in the same 
circumstances.100
While the European Court of Justice confi ned this statement to the individual 
circumstances of the Dior v. Evora case and aimed particularly at removing 
obstacles to the free movement of goods in the internal market,101 the decision of 
the Supreme Court of the Netherlands can be perceived as a fundamental shift  
in the continental-European tradition of precisely defi ned exceptions. In the 
Netherlands, the decision was predominantly understood to have opened up the 
closed catalogue of specifi c exceptions in the Dutch Copyright Act, as in force at 
that time.102 Several commentators placed the decision in the context of the fair 
use doctrine in the US.103 Instead of relying on abstract factors as guidelines for the 
identifi cation of a fair use, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands acknowledged 
that there was a possibility of using existing exceptions in the Dutch Copyright 
Act as a model for the creation of new exceptions. On the basis of a comparable 
balancing of interests, gaps in the limitation infrastructure could be fi lled as 
long as the envisaged new use privilege was in line with the Dutch system of 
exceptions.104 
Because of the use of an existing exception as a model provision for a new use 
privilege, Cohen Jehoram saw the judgment as an example of the application of 
legal norms by analogy. He expressed the view that such an analogous application 
of the law ‘was always permitted’ – even in the case of an exception to copyright.105 
98 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, ibid., para. 3.6.2.
99 ECJ, 20 January 1981, joined cases 55/80 and 57/80 (Musik-Vertrieb Membran and K-tel International v. 
GEMA), para. 15, online available at www.curia.eu.
100 ECJ, 4 November 1997, case C-337/95 (Dior v. Evora), para. 58.
101 ECJ, ibid., para. 58-59.
102 Cf. F.W. Grosheide, ‘De commercialisering van het auteursrecht’, Informatierecht/AMI 1996, p. 43 (43).
103 See Section 107 of the US Copyright Act and the case comments by J.H. Spoor, NJ 1996, no. 682, para. 2; 
P. Steinhauser, BIE 1998, p. 195 (212).
104 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 20 October 1995, NJ 1996, no. 682 (Dior v. Evora), para. 3.6.2.
105 See the case comment by H. Cohen Jehoram, AA 46 (1997), p. 640 (644).
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In his opinion, this analogous application did not indicate a departure from the 
continental-European dogma that exceptions had to be interpreted narrowly.106
Considering the fair use doctrine in the US, it is remarkable that the Supreme 
Court of the Netherlands referred to ‘the development of copyright as a means of 
protecting commercial interests’ in Dior v. Evora. In the US, the fair use doctrine 
is understood as a safeguard of freedom of speech within the copyright system.107 
Criticism, comment and news reporting are explicitly indicated as legitimate fair 
use purposes in the US Copyright Act.108 Moreover, the notion of transformative 
use traditionally constitutes an important factor capable of tipping the scales 
to a fi nding of fair use. As pointed out above, the fair use must aim to employ 
the copyrighted matter in a diff erent manner or for a purpose diff erent from the 
original. Mere repackaging or republication is insuffi  cient.109
In the Dior v. Evora case, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands did not 
focus on comparable considerations. Th e Court did not point out that Evora’s 
advertising could be regarded as an important form of commercial speech that 
deserved protection in the light of the fundamental guarantee of freedom of 
speech.110 Elements of ‘transformation’ of the copyrighted material – the perfume 
packaging and bottles – are sought in vain. Instead of pointing to some type of 
productive re-use,111 the Supreme Court of the Netherlands generally identifi ed a 
need for additional use privileges that was due to the development of copyright: 
its use as a means of protecting commercial interests. 
Refl ecting on this line of reasoning, Grosheide referred to the evolution of 
the modern ‘entrepreneurial copyright’ that had commenced with the inclusion 
of works of applied art in the copyright system. Th e protection of computer 
106 Cohen Jehoram, ibid., p. 644.
107 Cf. Netanel, ‘Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society’, p. 283.
108 See Section 107 of the US Copyright Act.
109 Supreme Court of the United States of America, 7 March 1994, 510 U.S. 569 (Campbell v. Acuff -Rose), 
section A. Cf. P.N. Leval, ‘Toward a Fair Use Standard’, Harvard Law Review 103 (1990), p. 1105 (1111).
110 As to the recognition of commercial freedom of expression, see ECHR, 22 May 1990, application no. 
12726/87, Autronic v. Switzerland, para. 47.
111 Th e notion of transformative use can also be applied in an industrial context. US courts relied on fair 
use, for instance, to deal with advanced search engine services. Th e Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the smaller, indexed images generated by Google’s image search service qualifi ed as a fair use under 
the US fair use doctrine. Interestingly, the court grounded its analysis on the notion of transformative 
use. Pointing out a signifi cant benefi t to the public, the court noted that ‘a search engine may be more 
transformative than a parody because a search engine provides an entirely new use for the original 
work, while a parody typically has the same entertainment purpose as the original work.’ See US Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 16 May 2007, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Fd 3d., para. 11. Th e court 
concluded that ‘the signifi cantly transformative nature of Google’s search engine, particularly in light 
of its public benefi t, outweighs Google’s superseding and commercial uses of the thumbnails in this 
case. In reaching this conclusion, we note the importance of analyzing fair use fl exibly in light of new 
circumstances.’ See US Court of Appeals, ibid., para. 12.
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programs as literary works also testifi ed to this development that made copyright, 
together with industrial property rights, a part of competition law – a vehicle 
for regulating the behaviour of competing market participants. Not surprisingly, 
the decision could also be viewed from the perspective of the free movement of 
goods and services in the internal market.112 According to Grosheide, a need for 
additional use privileges becomes understandable in the light of this evolution 
of the entrepreneurial copyright if it is assumed that the adoption of the existing 
exceptions in the Dutch Copyright Act can be traced back to a balancing of 
interests that was exclusively, or at least predominantly, based on individual 
authors. It is not surprising that this balancing of interests became inadequate 
the moment enterprises invoked copyright to strengthen their position in the 
fi ght for market shares.113
As the Dior v. Evora decision, therefore, primarily concerned the regulation 
of competition in the internal market, further decisions with a stronger freedom 
of speech aspect or a stronger element of transformative use would have been 
necessary to establish a Dutch doctrine of fl exible copyright limitations 
comparable to the fair use doctrine in the US. In particular, this result could 
have been achieved through decisions generating variants of the quotation 
right or broadening the breathing space for parody. As indicated above, these 
limitations lie at the core of the interface between copyright and freedom of 
speech/transformative use. Unfortunately, Dutch courts were hesitant to seize 
opportunities for revisiting Dior v. Evora in this context.
In the case Anne Frank Fonds v. Het Parool, the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam 
had to decide on the unauthorized publication of previously unpublished fragments 
from the so-called B-version of Anne Frank’s diary. Th e Dutch newspaper ‘Het 
Parool’ had published these fragments – in their entirety – on the cover page of 
the edition of 26 August 1998. Th e B-version is an adaptation of the original diary 
made by Anne Frank in 1944. Th e fragments concern 8 February 1944. Rumours 
about the existence of these previously unknown texts had already started prior 
to the publication in Het Parool. Th e publication was thus a sensation. Invoking 
copyright to the fragments, the Anne Frank Fonds sued Het Parool for copyright 
infringement.114
In the given circumstances, Het Parool could not invoke the statutory quotation 
right laid down in Article 15a DCA. As indicated above, the Dutch quotation 
right, in line with Article 10(1) BC, only covers material that has already been 
112 Grosheide, ‘De commercialisering van het auteursrecht’, p. 43 (45).
113 Grosheide, ibid., p. 45.
114 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 8 July 1999, Informatierecht/AMI 1999, p. 116 (Anne Frank Fonds v. Het 
Parool), para. 4.1-4.2.
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published lawfully. Even though the diary as such had already been published, 
this condition was not met with regard to the previously unknown, unpublished 
fragments. Seeking to defend the unauthorized publication in this situation, Het 
Parool invoked the Dior v. Evora decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
and argued that, as in Dior v. Evora, the case concerned a situation of which the 
legislator had not been aware – a gap in the Dutch limitation infrastructure that 
had to be fi lled on the basis of a comparable balancing of interests.115
Instead of using this argument as a basis for discussing the case in the light of 
the Dior v. Evora criteria, the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam denied the existence of 
a situation not considered by the lawmaker, thereby pointing to the requirement of 
lawful publication set forth in the Dutch right of quotation.116 Het Parool had more 
success with the further argument that, given the extraordinary news value of the 
publication, the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression and information 
in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights had to prevail over the 
restrictions following from the limited scope of the Dutch right of quotation. In 
this regard, the court conceded that in particular circumstances, it was conceivable 
that the protection of copyright imposed restrictions on freedom of expression 
and information that went beyond what was necessary for the protection of third 
party interests in a democratic society in the sense of Article 10(2) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.117 Weighing the commercial and moral interests of 
the Anne Frank Fonds against the extraordinary news value of the publication in 
Het Parool, the court nonetheless came to the conclusion that freedom of expression 
could not prevail in this case. Th e court pointed out that the publication in Het 
Parool had also served commercial interests, namely the later announcement 
of a new Anne Frank biography and a TV documentary based on this biography.118
Instead of adding a freedom of speech perspective to the competition-based 
Dior v. Evora judgment to allow an internal balancing of interests within the 
copyright system, the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam thus preferred to recognize 
the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression and information in the 
European Convention on Human Rights as an external balancing tool that 
could be invoked – in particular circumstances – to override statutory copyright 
exceptions in the Dutch Copyright Act.119 Th e court, in other words, did not seek 
115 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.11.
116 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.12.
117 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.16.
118 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, ibid., para. 4.21-4.22.
119 With regard to this external balancing of interests in the light of the fundamental guarantee of freedom 
of expression, and the question of an internal or external balancing of interests, see Dommering, 
De achtervolging van Prometheus; Geiger, ‘“Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law?’ p. 371; 
Strowel/Tulkens/Voorhoof, Droit d’auteur et liberté d’expression; Hugenholtz, ‘Copyright and Freedom 
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to enhance the internal fl exibility within the system of limitations in the Dutch 
Copyright Act. It relied on balancing mechanisms found outside copyright law. 
While this external balancing of interests did not prompt the Court of Appeal 
of Amsterdam to reject copyright claims in the Anne Frank case, the Court of 
Appeal of Th e Hague, on the same legal basis, ruled in favour of the journalist 
Karin Spaink in Scientology v. Spaink. On an XS4All webpage, Spaink had posted 
parts of the so-called ‘Fishman Affi  davit’ – a semi-secret written declaration that 
had been submitted in other court proceedings initiated by Scientology against 
Steven Fishman. Spaink used quotations from confi dential parts of the Fishman 
Affi  davit refl ecting the teachings and organization of Scientology to undergird 
her critique of Scientology.120 As in the previous Anne Frank case, the right of 
quotation set forth in Article 15a DCA was unavailable as a defence because 
the Fishman Affi  davit had never been published lawfully.121 However, Spaink 
successfully argued for direct application of the fundamental guarantee of 
freedom of expression and information in Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Th e Court of Appeal of Th e Hague agreed that the quotations 
contributed to a legitimate form of criticizing Scientology’s questionable ideas 
and behaviour. In the opinion of the court, Spaink’s use of the documents did not 
amount to copyright infringement against this background.122
Spaink also had invoked the Dior v. Evora decision of the Supreme Court 
of the Netherlands to defend her takings from the confi dential documents. In 
line with the earlier judgment in the Anne Frank case, however, the Court of 
Appeal of Th e Hague saw no room for creating additional fl exibility within 
the copyright system on this basis. Instead, the court rejected the Dior v. Evora 
argument.123 A further opportunity for adding a freedom of speech perspective to 
the competition-based Dior v. Evora judgment was missed. In consequence, Dior 
v. Evora did not lead to the evolution of a Dutch fair use doctrine that, in terms 
of its theoretical underpinning, was comparable with the focus on freedom of 
speech in the US.
of Expression in Europe’ p. 239; Dreier, ‘Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests’, p. 295; 
Macciacchini, Urheberrecht und Meinungsfreiheit; Benkler, ‘Free as the Air to Common Use’, p. 355; 
Netanel, ‘Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society’, p. 283.
120 Court of Appeal of Th e Hague, 4 September 2003, AMI 2003, p. 217 (Scientology v. Spaink), para. 2.
121 Court of Appeal of Th e Hague, ibid., para. 7.11.
122 Court of Appeal of Th e Hague, ibid., para. 8.2 and 13.
123 Court of Appeal of Th e Hague, ibid., para. 7.12. Cf. the case comment by F.W. Grosheide, IER 2003, 
no. 69, para. 2, who agrees that the case left  no room for the application of the Dior v. Evora rationale. 
K.J. Koelman, Computerrecht 2003, p. 350, and P.B. Hugenholtz, AMI 2003, p. 223, by contrast, qualify the 
Dior v. Evora decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands as a recognition of the confl ict between 
copyright and freedom of expression even though the argument based on Dior v. Evora was rejected in 
Scientology v. Spaink. 
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Although the Dutch fair use doctrine remained incomplete in the sense 
that the courts in later decisions did not rely on the Dior v. Evora rationale to 
prevent encroachments of copyright on freedom of speech, the underlying basic 
idea of an opening clause adding fl exibility to the closed catalogue of exceptions 
in the Dutch Copyright Act remained valid and was strongly supported in the 
Netherlands. In 1985, Spoor and Verkade had already pointed out that ‘not only 
a general fair use exception but also a less general exceptio artis which would 
leave artists more room for adapting the art works of others’ were missing in 
the Dutch Copyright Act.124 In 1989, Hugenholtz recommended the introduction 
of a general fair use regime modelled on the US fair use doctrine to minimize 
potential confl icts between copyright and freedom of information.125 When the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands opened up the closed catalogue of exceptions 
in the 1995 Dior v. Evora decision, this development was welcomed by the majority 
of case commentators.126 Th e decision inspired the Dutch Copyright Committee, 
an advisory body to the Ministry of Justice, to propose – already in 1998 – the 
adoption of an open, fair-use type provision in the Dutch Copyright Act.127 In 
following Dutch fair use literature, the central advantage of fl exibility inherent 
in open-ended fair use systems was emphasized against the background of the 
emerging information society. Alberdingk Th ijm underlined that a fl exible fair 
use framework would render the courts capable of safeguarding the delicate 
balance between the interests of copyright owners and those of the users of 
copyrighted material in the digital environment. Leaving the discretion to the 
courts to reshape the system of copyright limitations on the basis of fair use 
factors would reduce the need for constant amendments to legislation that had 
diffi  culty in keeping pace with the speed of technological development.128 
Arguing against fair use, Cohen Jehoram, on the contrary, warned of the 
corrosive eff ect of an open-ended fair use doctrine on the established Dutch 
system of narrowly circumscribed exceptions. In his view, a Dutch fair use 
doctrine would erode the legal certainty following from the much more precise 
defi nition of copyright exceptions in the Dutch Copyright Act. For this reason, 
a fair use system had to be deemed incompatible with the international three-
124 J.H. Spoor, D.W.F. Verkade, D.J.G. Visser, Auteursrecht, 1st ed., Deventer: Kluwer 1985, p. 145.
125 Hugenholtz, Auteursrecht op informatie, p. 170-171.
126 See the case comments by Grosheide, ‘De commercialisering van het auteursrecht’, p. 43 (50); J.H. Spoor, 
NJ 1996, no. 682, para. 2; P. Steinhauser, BIE 1998, p. 195 (212).
127 Commissie Auteursrecht, 18 August 1998, Advies over auteursrecht, naburige rechten en de nieuwe 
media, Th e Hague: Dutch Ministry of Justice 1998. Cf. C.A. Alberdingk Th ijm, ‘Brief naar het front: 
nieuws en fair use’, Informatierecht/AMI 1999, p. 143 (146).
128 C.A. Alberdingk Th ijm, ‘Fair use: het auteursrechtelijk evenwicht hersteld’, AMI 1998, p. 145, and ‘Fair 
use – In weiter Ferne, so nah’, AMI 1998, p. 176.
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step test requiring exceptions and limitations to be ‘certain special cases’.129 
Th ese counterarguments were rebutted in the further debate on fair use. It was 
shown that a fair use system resting on established case law off ered suffi  cient legal 
certainty and could hardly be deemed in confl ict with international obligations.130 
In the case of continental-European copyright systems, legal certainty could be 
ensured by adopting a fair use clause that, instead of replacing the traditional 
catalogue of precisely defi ned exceptions, merely supplemented this catalogue. As 
in Dior v. Evora, the more specifi c exceptions enumerated in the catalogue could 
serve as a reference point for the creation of new use privileges on the basis of 
the additional fair use clause. Instead of being an obstacle to fair use legislation, 
the international three-step test with its open-ended criteria was identifi ed as a 
model provision for the development of fair use factors.131
During the negotiations on the Information Society Directive, the Dutch 
Government pleaded for the adoption of a fair use clause supplementing the 
catalogue of more specifi c exceptions at the European level.132 Th is proposal 
had little success. Th e regulation of limitations and exceptions in Article 5 of 
the Information Society Directive does not contain an opening clause allowing 
the courts to model additional use privileges on the specifi c cases listed in the 
catalogue of permissible use privileges. Instead of distilling fair use factors from 
the three-step test, the test functions as an additional safety net in the Directive. 
Th e cases enumerated in the catalogue of permissible exceptions and limitations 
129 H. Cohen Jehoram, ‘Fair use – die ferne Geliebte’, AMI 1998, p. 174; H. Cohen Jehoram, ‘Nu de 
gevolgen van trouw en ontrouw aan de Auteursrechtrichtlijn voor fair use, tijdelijke reproductie en 
driestappentoets’, AMI 2005, p. 153; H. Cohen Jehoram, ‘Restrictions on Copyright and their Abuse’, EIPR 
2005, p. 359.
130 Senft leben, Copyright, Limitations and the Th ree-Step Test, p. 133-137 and 162-168; A. Förster, Fair Use, 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2008, p. 191-201. As to the debate on compliance, see J. Bornkamm, ‘Der 
Dreistufentest als urheberrechtliche Schrankenbestimmung – Karriere eines Begriff s’, in: H.-J. Ahrens, 
J. Bornkamm, W. Gloy, J. Starck, J. von Ungern-Sternberg (eds), Festschrift  für Willi Erdmann zum 65. 
Geburtstag, Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München: Carl Heymanns 2002, p. 29 (45-46); M. Leaff er, ‘Th e Uncertain 
Future of Fair Use in a Global Information Marketplace’, Ohio State Law Journal 62 (2001), p. 849; R. 
Okediji, ‘Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 39 (2000), 
p. 75 (116-130); J.E. Cohen, ‘WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will Fair Use 
Survive?’, EIPR 1999, p. 236; T. Newby, ‘What’s Fair Here Is Not Fair Everywhere: Does the American Fair 
Use Doctrine Violate International Copyright Law?’, Stanford Law Review 1999, p. 1633.
131 Cf. M.R.F. Senft leben, ‘Fair Use in the Netherlands: A Renaissance?’, AMI 2009, p. 1, online available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563986; M.R.F. Senft leben, ‘Th e International Th ree-Step Test: A Model 
Provision for EC Fair Use Legislation’, Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and 
E-Commerce Law 1 (2010), p. 67, available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723867; M.R.F. Senft leben, 
‘Tegengif of overdosis Tegengif of overdosis? Over rechtszekerheid bij privé-kopiëren uit illegale bron’, 
AMI 2011, p. 153.
132 See the offi  cial documents refl ecting the government’s position, Tweede Kamer 1998-1999, 26 538, 
Nr. 1, p. 7. Cf. Alberdingk Th ijm, ‘Brief naar het front: nieuws en fair use’, p. 143 (146).
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may only be applied in accordance with the criteria of the three-step test.133
With this confi guration of copyright exceptions in the EU, the room for 
national fair use solutions was substantially reduced. As a closed catalogue 
of exceptions was set forth in Article 5, the Information Society Directive 
deprived national lawmakers of the possibility of introducing, in the fi eld of the 
exclusive rights harmonized by the Directive, a fair use system that would allow 
judges to create new, additional use privileges that might become necessary to 
satisfy domestic social, cultural or economic needs. However, as several of the 
exceptions enumerated in the catalogue of Article 5 of the Directive are open 
exception prototypes rather than constituting narrowly defi ned exceptions, the 
option remained to implement literal copies of the open exception prototypes in 
national copyright legislation and combine these literal copies with the abstract 
criteria of the three-step test. In this way, a semi-open fair use system could have 
been established in the Netherlands and other EU member states that would have 
off ered fl exibility with regard to the purposes listed in the provision while not 
allowing the courts to go beyond these purposes.134 When several open exception 
prototypes enumerated in the Information Society Directive135 are combined with 
the three-step test, the following semi-open provision comes to the fore: 
It does not constitute an infringement to use a work or other subject-matter 
for non-commercial scientifi c research or illustrations for teaching, for the 
reporting of current events, for criticism or review of material that has 
already been lawfully made available to the public, or quotations from such 
material serving comparable purposes, for caricature, parody or pastiche, 
or the incidental inclusion in other material, provided that such use does 
not confl ict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter 
and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right 
holder.136
133 See Article 5(5) of the Information Society Directive. Cf. J. Reinbothe, ‘Die EG-Richtlinie zum 
Urheberrecht in der Informationsgesellschaft ’, GRUR Int. 2001, p. 733 (740), predicting that EU member 
states would have considerably less room to manoeuvre because of the three-step test. See also the critical 
comments on this understanding of the three-step test made at an earlier stage of the negotiations on 
the Directive by T. Heide, ‘Th e Berne Th ree-Step Test and the Proposed Copyright Directive’, EIPR 1999, 
p. 105 (107).
134 M.R.F. Senft leben, ‘Beperkingen à la carte: Waarom de Auteursrechtrichtlijn ruimte laat voor fair use’, 
AMI 2003, p. 10; Senft leben, Copyright, Limitations and the Th ree-Step Test, p. 264-268 and 278-281.
135 Articles 5(3)(a), 5(3)(c), 5(3)(d), 5(3)(i), 5(3)(k) of the Information Society Directive.
136 For a more detailed discussion of this remaining option, see P.B. Hugenholtz, M.R.F. Senft leben, Fair Use 
in Europe. In Search of Flexibilities, Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law/VU Centre for Law and 
Governance 2011, p. 17-18, online available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959554.
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Implementing the Information Society Directive, the Dutch lawmaker did not 
use this remaining option. As legislators in other EU member states, the Dutch 
authorities sought to safeguard the traditional Dutch system of exceptions. 
Instead of combining several exception prototypes in a semi-open provision 
with fl exible criteria derived from the three-step test, the Dutch lawmaker 
sought to broaden long-standing Dutch exceptions insofar as possible under the 
Information Society Directive. Furthermore, new exceptions were adopted from 
the list in the Directive that had not previously been part of the Dutch system 
of exceptions. As discussed above, the right of quotation was broadened during 
the implementation of the Information Society Directive. Th e exception for 
caricature, parody and pastiche in Article 5(3)(k) of the Directive was added to 
the catalogue of permissible exceptions and became Article 18b DCA.137 Th e three-
step test in Article 5(5) of the Information Society Directive was not implemented 
into Dutch copyright law.
Th e discussion about fair use continued in the Netherlands aft er the 
implementation of the Information Society Directive. In this further debate, 
the role of the three-step test occupied centre stage. Does the EU three-step test 
constitute a restriction imposed on the exceptions in the Dutch Copyright Act 
that should have been implemented into national law?138 Or can the three-step 
test still serve as a vehicle for adding fl exibility to the traditional continental-
European system of narrowly circumscribed exceptions in the Dutch Copyright 
Act?139 In 2011, the Dutch Government announced initiatives to commence a 
debate on the adoption of a fair use clause at the European level.140 Hence, the 
conviction that the closed catalogue of copyright exceptions should be opened 
up – refl ected in the Dior v. Evora decision of the Supreme Court – survived in 
the Netherlands.141 
137 See the offi  cial government document explaining the implementation of the Information Society 
Directive, Tweede Kamer 2001-2002, 28 482, Nr. 3 (Memorie van Toelichting).
138 In this sense particularly H. Cohen Jehoram, ‘Implementatie van de Auteursrechtrichtlijn – De stille 
strijd tegen een spookrijder’, NJB 2002, p. 1690; Cohen Jehoram, ‘Nu de gevolgen van trouw en ontrouw 
aan de Auteursrechtrichtlijn voor fair use, tijdelijke reproductie en driestappentoets’, p. 153; H. Cohen 
Jehoram, ‘Wie is bang voor de driestappentoets in de Auteursrechtrichtlijn?’, in: N.A.N.M. van Eijk, P.B. 
Hugenholtz (eds), Dommering-bundel, Amsterdam: Otto Cramwinckel 2008, p. 57.
139 In this sense particularly Senft leben, ‘Fair Use in the Netherlands: A Renaissance?’, p. 1; Senft leben, ‘Th e 
International Th ree-Step Test: A Model Provision for EC Fair Use Legislation’, p. 67.
140 See the offi  cial government letter to the parliament in which the Dutch Government explains its plans 
and objectives in the fi eld of copyright law, Speerpuntenbrief auteursrecht 20@20, Tweede Kamer 2010-
2011, 29 838, nr. 29, online available at www.ie-forum.nl, no. 9541, p. 13.
141 For the creation of additional breathing space in the absence of a fair use clause, Dutch courts still rely 
particularly on the direct application of the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression. For a 
recent example of this court practice in the fi eld of industrial designs protection, see District Court of 
Th e Hague, 4 May 2011, IER 2011, no. 39 (Nadia Plesner Joensen v. Louis Vuitton), para. 4.6-4.11. For a 
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4. European context
4.1 Broadening of the right of quotation
As explained above, the implementation of the Information Society Directive into 
Dutch copyright law led to a broadening of the right of quotation in the Dutch 
Copyright Act. Th e traditional context requirement confi ning the exemption 
of quotations to use in the context of an ‘announcement, review, polemic 
discussion or scientifi c treatise’ was attenuated. Th e amended Dutch quotation 
right also covers quotations serving ‘comparable purposes’.142 Considering 
this relaxation of the traditional context requirement, Dutch courts brought 
automatically generated Internet search results within the scope of the right of 
quotation.143 Besides texts, this fl exible application of the Dutch quotation right 
aft er the implementation of the Information Society Directive also covers picture 
thumbnails. Th e Dutch quotation right, therefore, was transformed into an 
engine of freedom of information that supports advanced search engine services.
In the European context, this example of a fl exible implementation of the 
right of quotation recognized in the Information Society Directive is of particular 
importance. While certain features of the harmonized regulatory framework in 
the Directive – the enumeration of permissible exceptions in Article 5 is closed, 
exceptions can additionally be scrutinized in the light of the three-step test – 
give rise to concerns about insuffi  cient fl exibility, it must not be overlooked that 
many exceptions listed in Article 5 of the Directive, as already indicated above, 
constitute prototypes for national lawmaking rather than precisely circumscribed 
exceptions in the sense of the continental-European copyright tradition.144 
Th e quotation right recognized in Article 5(3)(d) of the Directive, for instance, 
allows quotations from material already lawfully made available to the public, 
for purposes ‘such as’ criticism or review. National legislators implementing the 
quotation right are thus free to include further purposes. In consequence, the 
scope of a national quotation right based on the prototype in Article 5(3)(d) may 
diff er from country to country.145
discussion of the decision, see D.J.G. Visser, ‘Darfurnica: modellenrecht versus kunstvrijheid’, NJ 2011, 
p. 740. 
142 Article 15a DCA.
143 Court of Appeals of Arnhem, 4 July 2006, AMI 2007, p. 93 (Zoekallehuizen.nl); District Court 
of Alkmaar, 7 August 2007, AMI 2007, p. 148 (Baas in Eigen Huis v. Plazacasa). For a discussion of these 
decisions, see section 3 above.
144 Cf. Senft leben, ‘Beperkingen à la carte’, p. 10; Senft leben, Copyright, Limitations and the Th ree-Step Test, 
p. 264-268 and 278-281.
145 For critical comments on the harmonizing eff ect of the Information Society Directive against this 
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Th ese diff erences in the implementation of the quotation right can have a 
signifi cant impact on the availability of information services in a given EU member 
state. Implementing the Information Society Directive, the Dutch legislator, as 
explained, decided to broaden the scope of the right of quotation. In Germany, by 
contrast, the traditional confi nement of the quotation right to criticism or review 
was upheld. Th is more restrictive approach limits the room to manoeuvre for 
the courts. In a decision dealing with Google’s image search service under the 
German right of quotation, the German Federal Court of Justice concluded that 
the unauthorized use of picture thumbnails for search engine purposes did not 
fall under the right of quotation in § 51 of the German Copyright Act. To fulfi l the 
traditional context requirement that had not been abandoned, the user making 
the quotation had to establish an inner connection between the quoted material 
and her own thoughts. Th is requirement was not satisfi ed in the case of picture 
thumbnails that were merely used to inform the public about contents available 
on the Internet.146 In this context, the Court stated that
neither the technical developments concerning the dissemination of 
information on the Internet nor the interests of the parties which the 
exception seeks to protect justify an extensive interpretation of § 51 of 
the German Copyright Act that goes beyond the purpose of making 
quotations. Neither the freedom of information of other Internet users, 
nor the freedom of communication or the freedom of trade of search 
engine providers, requires such an extensive interpretation.147
Th is clarifi cation indicates that the German Federal Court of Justice, because 
of insuffi  cient fl exibility in the German system of exceptions, was rendered 
incapable of solving the case on the basis of the right of quotation. Instead, the 
Court created breathing space for the image search service by assuming that 
Google’s use of the pictures was not unlawful because the copyright owner had 
consented implicitly to use of her material by the image search service by making 
her works available on the Internet without employing technical means to block 
the automatic indexing and displaying of online content by search engines.148 
background, see P.B. Hugenholtz, ‘Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid’, 
EIPR 2000, p. 499.
146 German Federal Court of Justice, 29 April 2010, case I ZR 69/08, p. 11-12, online available in German 
at www.bundesgerichtshof.de. Cf. Th . Dreier, ‘Th umbnails als Zitate? – Zur Reichweite von § 51 UrhG 
in der Informationsgesellschaft ’, in: U. Blaurock, J. Bornkamm, C. Kirchberg (eds), Festschrift  für Achim 
Krämer zum 70. Geburtstag, Berlin: De Gruyter 2009, p. 225.
147 German Federal Court of Justice, ibid., 12-13.
148 German Federal Court of Justice, ibid., 14-19. With regard to the later extension of this implied consent 
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Th is assumption of implicit consent, however, bypasses the problem of an overly 
restrictive ‘criticism or review’ requirement instead of solving it.149 A more fl exible 
implementation of the quotation prototype of Article 5(3)(d) of the Directive 
– comparable to the implementation strategy followed in the Netherlands – 
would have allowed the German Federal Court of Justice to solve the case more 
consistently on the basis of the right of quotation. In this way, a questionable 
expansion of the rules governing implicit consent in German private law could 
have been avoided. 
From a European perspective, it is important to note against this background 
that the wording of Article 5(3)(d) of the Information Society Directive has 
inspired an implementation strategy in the Netherlands which brings picture 
thumbnails under the umbrella of the right of quotation, whereas in Germany the 
maintenance of the traditional context requirement prevents the courts from this 
broader reading of the use privilege. Th e comparison of diff erent implementation 
strategies reveals that national lawmakers oft en sought to safeguard their 
individual national traditions in the fi eld of copyright exceptions rather than 
intending to exhaust the fl exibility inherent in the exception prototypes set forth 
in the Directive. Th e scope of national derivatives of a permissible EU exception, 
therefore, must not be equated with the breathing space off ered by the underlying 
prototype at the European level. Th ese national derivatives may be much more 
restrictive. 
Th e Information Society Directive, in other words, contains fl exibilities that 
may be invisible at the national level because of an overly cautious and restrictive 
implementation. Th e identifi cation of these fl exibilities can become crucial when 
it comes to new technological developments that require the recalibration of the 
balance between the exploitation interests of copyright owners and the need to 
safeguard freedom of expression and information in the digital environment. 
Th e example of advanced Internet search services displaying picture thumbnails 
testifi es to the constant need to safeguard this delicate balance in copyright law.
To identify hidden fl exibilities that may be required for the balancing exercise 
doctrine to postings by third parties, see German Federal Court of Justice, 19 October 2011, case I ZR 
140/10, online available in German at www.bundesgerichtshof.de.
149 See the critical comments by M. Leistner, ‘Th e German Federal Supreme Court’s Judgment 
on Google’s Image Search – A Topical Example of the “Limitations” of the European Approach to 
Exceptions and Limitations’, IIC 42 (2011), p. 417; G. Spindler, ‘Bildersuchmaschinen, Schranken und 
konkludente Einwilligung im Urheberrecht – Besprechung der Entscheidung “Vorschaubilder”’, GRUR 
2010, p. 785; L. Guibault, ‘Why Cherry-Picking Never Leads to Harmonisation’, Journal of Intellectual 
Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law 1 (2010), p. 55, available online at http://www.
jipitec.eu; M.R.F. Senft leben, ‘Bridging the Diff erences between Copyright’s Legal Traditions – Th e 
Emerging EC Fair Use Doctrine’, Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 57, No. 3 (2010), p. 521, 
available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723902. 
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that continues to challenge national copyright laws across all EU member states, 
the wording of an exception prototype in the Information Society Directive must 
be compared with national derivatives. In all respects where the prototype off ers 
more room than a given national implementation, the domestic lawmaker is free 
to enhance the scope of the use privilege currently off ered under national law 
without trespassing the boundaries of the acquis communautaire. Th e German 
legislator, for instance, would be free to adhere to the more fl exible approach to 
the quotation right followed in the Netherlands, and abandon the traditional 
context requirement that restricts the right of quotation to criticism and review. 
Th erefore, a comparison of diff erent national implementation strategies 
is central to the further development of copyright law under the Information 
Society Directive. In the fi eld of the right of quotation, the Dutch implementation 
of Article 5(3)(d) of the Directive constitutes an important precursor for a 
European solution to the problem of automatically generated search results. It 
may contribute to a more consistent solution of the image search dilemma in 
Germany and also France where courts are also groping for solutions in this 
area.150 Against this background, the application of Article 5(3)(d) in line with the 
Dutch implementation strategy has the advantage of off ering a solution within the 
specifi c system of copyright exceptions. General doctrines of private law need not 
be stretched for this purpose. Moreover, the application of Article 5(3)(d) off ers the 
important advantage of a solution on the basis of harmonized European copyright 
law. A fi nal affi  rmative judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
on the applicability of Article 5(3)(d) to automatically generated search results, for 
instance, could pave the way for harmonized copyright standards with regard to 
enhanced search engine services in all 27 EU member states. 
Given the key position held by the Court of Justice in respect of the further 
development of the European copyright limitation infrastructure, it is of utmost 
importance that the Court, when taking decisions on exceptions listed in the 
Information Society Directive, consider the repercussions that a ruling in one 
specifi c case may have on the delicate balancing of interests in copyright law 
to be carried out with regard to a much wider variety of cases in EU member 
150 In SAIF (Société des auteurs des arts visuels et de l’image fi xe) v. Google France, the Court of Paris had 
arrived at the application of the law of California (i.e. the US fair use doctrine) to allegedly infringing 
picture thumbnails being generated by the Google image search service. On appeal, the Court of Appeal 
of Paris found refuge for Google in the application, by analogy, of the safe harbour for hosting available 
under French law (in conformity with the EU e-Commerce Directive) to passive Internet service 
providers. Th e Court of Appeal noted in this context that the display of picture thumbnails could not 
be deemed excessive in the light of the importance of disseminating information about pictures and 
images available on the Internet. See Court of Appeal of Paris, 26 January 2011, case 08/13423 (SAIF v. 
Google France). 
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states. Th is responsibility for suffi  cient fl exibility within the EU system of 
copyright limitations requires a cautious approach that is sometimes sought in 
vain in proceedings before the Court of Justice. In Eva Maria Painer v. Standard 
VerlagsGmbH, Advocate General Trstenjak, for instance, espoused a conservative 
approach to the right of quotation by requiring a ‘material reference back to 
the quoted work in the form of a description, commentary or analysis’.151 Th e 
adoption of this restrictive approach by the Court of Justice, inevitably, would 
have endangered the liberal application of the quotation right in the Netherlands. 
It would have frustrated a European solution of the image search dilemma on 
the basis of the Dutch approach to Article 5(3)(d) of the Directive. Against this 
background, the Court rightly refrained from adopting the restrictive reading of 
the provision proposed by Trstenjak. Th e Court was also right in underlining the 
need for a fair balance between the rights and interests of authors and the rights of 
users of protected material, and for an interpretation of the conditions set forth in 
Article 5(3)(d) enabling the eff ectiveness of the quotation right and safeguarding 
its purpose. Most importantly, however, the Court stated that Article 5(3)(d) was
 intended to strike a fair balance between the right of freedom of expression 
of users of a work or other protected subject-matter and the reproduction 
right conferred on authors.152 
Along these lines, the quotation right recognized in Article 5(3)(d) of the 
Information Society Directive can be updated appropriately in the digital 
environment in the light of the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression 
and information. Th e above-described fl exible implementation of the quotation 
right in the Dutch Copyright Act can serve as a model for the further 
harmonization of the quotation right at the European level in this context.153 
151 Opinion AG Trstenjak, 12 April 2011, in CJEU, case C-145/10 (Eva Maria Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH), 
para. 210, online available at www.curia.eu. 
152 CJEU, 1 December 2011, case C-145/10 (Eva Maria Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH), para. 132-134, 
online available at www.curia.eu.
153 See in this regard also the broad quotation right in Article 5.2(1)(d) of the European Copyright Code 
that is the result of the Wittem Project that was established in 2002 as a collaboration between copyright 
scholars across the European Union concerned with the future development of European copyright 
law. Th e proposed European Copyright Code of the Wittem Project is available online at www.
copyrightcode.eu. It provides model legislation for an EU Copyright Code to come. Recognizing the 
need for reconciling copyright protection with freedom of expression and information, Article 5.2(1)(d) 
generally permits, to the extent justifi ed by the purpose, ‘use by way of quotation of lawfully disclosed 
works.’ It is clarifi ed in this context that a quotation may in certain cases cover the entire work.
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4.2 Parallel universe of limitations for parody
From the perspective of EU copyright law, the way in which breathing space for 
parody has been created under the Dutch Copyright Act is of particular interest. 
As explained above, the Dutch Copyright Act off ers two mechanisms. On the one 
hand, a parody may qualify as a free adaptation in the sense that it constitutes 
a ‘new, original work’ keeping a suffi  cient distance from the original work. On 
the other hand, the Dutch legislator added a specifi c parody exception to the 
catalogue of exceptions in the Dutch Copyright Act during the implementation 
of the Information Society Directive. Th e fi rst argument – free adaptation – rests 
on the consideration that a parody with new, original features can be qualifi ed as 
an independent work falling outside the scope of the right of adaptation granted 
in Article 13 DCA. As a result, it remains unaff ected by copyright claims relating 
to the original work that is ridiculed. 
Th e breathing space resulting from this fi rst argument must not be 
overestimated. In line with the 1984 Suske en Wiske judgment of the Supreme 
Court of the Netherlands,154 the parodist may include only those features of the 
original work that are necessary to make the target of her mockery identifi able. 
Otherwise, the parody cannot be deemed a free adaptation constituting a ‘new, 
original work’. Considering the limited breathing space following from this fi rst 
argument, the Dutch legislator decided to adopt the parody exception refl ected 
in Article 5(3)(k) of the Information Society Directive. With this second option 
– a specifi c parody exception – additional room became available. Instead of 
asking whether the taking from the original work was necessary for identifying 
the target of the mockery, Dutch courts focus on the contrast that is achieved 
through the parody when the new parody exception is invoked.155
From the perspective of harmonized EU copyright law, this two-tiered 
approach gives rise to complex questions concerning the system of exclusive 
rights underlying EU copyright law. Th e Information Society Directive only 
harmonizes the right of reproduction, the right of communication to the public, 
the right of making available to the public and the right of distribution.156 Other 
exclusive rights, such as the right of adaptation,157 fall outside the scope of the 
Directive.
Against this background, it may be argued that the traditional free adaptation 
154 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 13 April 1984, NJ 1984, no. 524 (Suske en Wiske), para. 1.
155 Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, 13 September 2011, case LJN BS7825, online available at www.rechtspraak.
nl (Mercis and Bruna v. Punt), para. 4.13.
156 Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Information Society Directive.
157 See the separate recognition of adaptation rights at the international level in Articles 8, 12 and 14 BC.
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rule in Dutch copyright law – exempting parodies that constitute a new, original 
work – is a specifi c national regulation of the right of adaptation that remains 
unaff ected by the Information Society Directive because the latter does not cover 
the right of adaptation. In this line of reasoning, national policymakers enjoy 
considerable freedom in the fi eld of the right of adaptation. Besides the traditional 
case of parody, this freedom may be used, for instance, to create breathing space 
for other forms of dealing productively with pre-existing works, such as use in 
the context of appropriation art158 and user-generated content.159 
Room for these latter forms of transforming copyrighted material can hardly 
be identifi ed in the Information Society Directive itself. While providing for a 
fl exible parody exception, the catalogue of permissible exceptions in Article 5 
of the Directive does not contain comparable use privileges for other ways of 
transforming protected material into new creations even though this enhanced 
breathing space can be deemed desirable in the light of the fundamental 
guarantee of freedom of expression. Considering these shortcomings, traditional 
free adaptation rules at the national level, such as the Dutch exemption of new, 
original works, may off er a way out of the overly restrictive framework of EU 
copyright law. Admittedly, the traditional free adaptation rule in the Netherlands 
would have to be applied much more fl exibly for this purpose. 
National free adaptation rules need not be as restrictive as the Dutch exemption 
of new, original works. Th e aforementioned German free adaptation rule – 
covering adaptations that can be qualifi ed as an ‘independent work’ – requires a 
transformation of the original work with new features of its own that make the 
individual features of the original work fade away.160 Applying this standard, the 
German Federal Court of Justice recognized in parody cases that the required 
distance from the original work, making its individual features fade away, could 
not only be achieved through substantial alterations of the original work. By 
158 Cf. Kabel, ‘Auteursrechtelijke grenzen aan de vrijheid van de beeldende kunstenaar’, p. 68; M. de Zwaan, 
‘Het geparodieerd citaat: een bijzondere vorm van begripsverwarring’, in: F.W. Grosheide (ed.), Parodie 
– parodie en kunstcitaat, Th e Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2006, p. 83.
159 Cf. E. Lee, ‘Warming Up to User-Generated Content’, University of Illinois Law Review 2008 (5), p. 
1459, available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116671; M. Knopp, ‘Fanfi ction – nutzergenerierte 
Inhalte und das Urheberrecht’, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2010, p. 28; Helberger/
Guibault/Janssen/van Eijk/Angelopoulos/van Hoboken, Legal Aspects of User Created Content; OECD, 
‘Participative Web: User-Created Content’, document DSTI/ICCP/IE(2006)7/Final, dated 12 April 2007, 
online available at http://www.oecd.org/document/40/0,3746,en_2649_34223_39428648_1_1_1_1,00.
html.
160 See the overview provided by P.E. Geller, ‘A German Approach to Fair Use: Test Cases for TRIPs Criteria 
for Copyright Limitations?’, Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 57 (2010), p. 901; F.W. Grosheide, 
‘De grondslagen van de parodie-exceptie’, in: F.W. Grosheide (ed.), Parodie – parodie en kunstcitaat, Th e 
Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2006, p. 1 (19-25); H.E. Ruijsenaars, ‘Een onoverwinnelijke Galliër? 
Enkele opmerkingen t.a.v. de parodie op stripfi guren’, Informatierecht/AMI 1993, p. 143 (149).
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contrast, an inner distance, such as the distance created by a parodist’s mockery, 
could also be suffi  cient.161 Given this fl exible approach, the German lawmaker 
decided not to implement the specifi c parody exception set forth in Article 5(3)(k) 
of the Directive. Th e breathing space resulting from the long-standing national 
free adaptation rule was deemed suffi  cient. 
Th e German free adaptation rule generally applies to transformations of 
copyrighted material. In the Perlentaucher case, for instance, the German Federal 
Court of Justice confi rmed the application of the general principles governing 
the determination of free adaptations to abstracts derived from book reviews 
that had been published in the German newspaper ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung’.162 When applied broadly, the German free adaptation rule could thus 
become relevant in cases of user-generated content. Arguably, the individual, 
non-commercial nature of certain amateur performances of protected material 
posted on the Internet also justify to assume a suffi  cient inner distance from the 
underlying original work. User-generated content could then be exempted on the 
grounds that it constitutes an ‘independent work’ that makes the features of the 
original work fade away.
However, additional breathing space for transformations – appropriation art, 
user-generated content – outside the closed catalogue of exceptions in Article 
5 of the Information Society Directive cannot be created without showing that 
the adaptation right can be separated from the reproduction right harmonized 
in EU copyright law. Otherwise, arguments based on national free adaptation 
rules would become invalid. A free adaptation amounting to an infringement 
of the harmonized right of reproduction can no longer be regulated freely at the 
national level without any interference with the Information Society Directive. 
By contrast, the free adaptation would also have to be justifi ed in the light of 
the exceptions to the reproduction right that are declared permissible under the 
Directive. Th e closed catalogue in Article 5 of the Directive, therefore, would 
enter the picture again and put an end to the creation of additional breathing 
space on the basis of national free adaptation rules. 
As Spoor has shown, a distinction between the right of reproduction and 
the right of adaptation can be drawn by assuming that, while reproduction 
concerns the copying of the particular form of a work determined by the author, 
the adaptation right covers changes to the underlying corpus mysticum.163 A 
161 See G. Schulze, in: Th . Dreier, G. Schulze, Urheberrechtsgesetz – Kommentar, 3rd ed., Munich: C.H. Beck 
2008, p. 366.
162 German Federal Court of Justice, 1 December 2010, case I ZR 12/08 (Perlentaucher), GRUR 2011, p. 134 
(137-138), online available at www.bundesgerichtshof.de.
163 J.H. Spoor, ‘De twee betekenissen van het woord ‘verveelvoudigen’ in de Auteurswet 1912’, 
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distinction between the right of reproduction and the right of adaptation is also 
drawn in international copyright law. While Article 9(1) BC establishes a far-
reaching general right of reproduction covering reproduction ‘in any manner 
or form’, a separate right of adaptation is granted in Article 12 BC.164 A distinct 
right of translation is moreover recognized in Article 8 BC. In line with this 
international framework and the theoretical distinction between mere copying 
and changes to the intellectual substance of a work, the Information Society 
Directive can be understood to cover only literal reproduction. Th e regulation of 
transformations – changes to the corpus mysticum of a copyright protected work 
– is left  to national lawmaking.165
At this point of the inquiry, the Dutch two-tiered approach in the fi eld of 
parody exemptions gives rise to a delicate question. If it is true that adaptations 
can be distinguished from reproductions, and if it is also true that the Information 
Society Directive only covers acts of reproduction and leaves room for the national 
regulation of adaptations, why should the Information Society Directive provide 
for a parody exception in Article 5(3)(k)? And why should the Dutch legislator, 
in the light of a long-standing national free adaptation rule covering parodies, 
implement this parody exception at the national level? 
One possible answer is that the parody exception laid down in Article 5(3)(k) 
of the Directive indicates that the Information Society Directive, regardless of 
the distinction between reproduction and adaptation, seeks to also harmonize 
the right of adaptation. Th e Dutch implementation of Article 5(3)(k) could be 
seen as a confi rmation of this broad scope of the Directive. Assuming that the 
Information Society Directive also covers the right of adaptation, the Dutch 
lawmaker may have found it necessary to include the specifi c parody exception 
refl ected in the Directive. Th is line of argument, however, fi nds no support in the 
draft ing history of the parody exception in the Dutch Copyright Act. As pointed 
out above, the Dutch lawmaker did not erode the national free adaptation rule 
when implementing the Directive. Th e additional adoption of a specifi c parody 
exception was intended to off er enhanced breathing space for parodies. Th e 
 Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notaris-ambt en Registratie 105 (1974), p. 165 (167).
164 A further right of cinematographic adaptation is granted in Article 14 BC. With regard to the interplay 
of reproduction and adaptation rights at the international level, see the detailed analysis provided by 
S. Ricketson, J.C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights – Th e Berne Convention 
and Beyond, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006, p. 652-656. Th ey conclude that Union 
countries enjoy considerable freedom to shape the right of adaptation and determine the nature of 
relevant adaptations at the national level. 
165 Cf. M. Walter, in: M. Walter, S. von Lewinski (eds), European Copyright Law: A Commentary, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2010, p. 964; S. Bechtold, ‘Commentary on the Information Society Directive’, 
in: Th . Dreier, P.B. Hugenholtz (eds), Concise European Copyright Law, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 
Law International 2006, p. 358.
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Dutch implementation of Article 5(3)(k), therefore, can hardly be used as an 
argument for the assumption that the Information Society Directive covers the 
right of adaptation.
Considering the implementation in the Netherlands, the Information Society 
Directive, by contrast, must be understood to off er additional breathing space 
with regard to cases where a parody does not meet the national requirements for a 
free adaptation and, instead, is deemed to involve a relevant act of reproduction of 
protected features of the underlying original work. Besides those parodies falling 
under the national free adaptation rule, national legislation is thus also free to 
exempt parodies that amount to (partly) reproduction. Th is situation corresponds 
to the dilemma that had arisen in the Netherlands prior to the implementation 
of the Information Society Directive. Because of the restrictive necessity test 
adopted by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Suske en Wiske, the scope 
of the free adaptation rule in the Netherlands – in contrast to other countries, 
such as Germany – remained relatively limited. A taking from the original that 
was unnecessary to identify the target of the mockery exposed the parodist to an 
action based on infringement of the right of reproduction. As Article 5(3)(k) of 
the Directive makes it clear that, besides those parodies that are exempted on the 
basis of national free adaptation rules, legislators in EU member states are free to 
also exempt parodies amounting to reproduction,166 the Dutch lawmaker seized 
this opportunity for enhancing the breathing space for parody and supplemented 
the traditional free adaptation rule – the exemption of new, original works in the 
sense of Article 13 DCA – with an explicit parody exception modelled on Article 
5(3)(k) of the Information Society Directive.167
Th e Dutch two-tiered approach to the exemption of parody, therefore, shows 
the considerable fl exibility provided by the Information Society Directive to 
create room for parody at the national level.168 On the one hand, legislators in EU 
member states are free to regulate the right of adaptation because this exclusive 
right does not fall within the scope of the Directive. Using this freedom, national 
lawmakers can maintain or adopt national free adaptation rules, such as the 
‘new, original work’ exemption in the Netherlands or the ‘independent work’ 
exemption in Germany. Th is freedom is not limited to parodies. As the Directive 
does not deal with the right of adaptation, national legislators are also free to 
extend the scope of free adaptation rules to other transformations of copyrighted 
material, such as transformations in the context of appropriation art and user-
166 With regard to adaptations amounting to reproduction, see A. Ohly, ‘Economic Rights’, in: E. Derclaye 
(ed.), Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2009, p. 212 (218).
167 Article 18b of the Dutch Copyright Act.
168 Cf. Hugenholtz/Senft leben, Fair Use in Europe, p. 26-28.
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generated content. On the other hand, national lawmakers are also free, in the 
fi eld of parody, to complement national free adaptation rules with the specifi c 
parody exception listed in Article 5(3)(k) of the Directive. In this way, national 
legislation can clarify that, besides those parodies falling under the national free 
adaptation rule, parodies that amount to relevant acts of reproduction are also 
exempted.
4.3 Paving the way for an EU fair use doctrine
As explained above, many scholars and policymakers in the Netherlands share 
the view that a fair use clause would have benefi cial eff ects on the system of 
copyright exceptions in the EU. Th is conviction survived the implementation of 
the Information Society Directive. Th e above-described Dior v. Evora decision of 
the Supreme Court of the Netherlands constitutes an important precedent in this 
context. To open up the closed catalogue of exceptions in the Dutch Copyright 
Act, the Supreme Court stated that, on the basis of a comparable balancing of 
interests, courts could model new use privileges on existing statutory exceptions. 
Instead of devising fair use factors, the Court recognized that there was a 
possibility of using the established, narrowly circumscribed statutory exceptions 
as a basis for the identifi cation of additional use privileges.169 
Th e importance of this case precedent must not be underestimated in 
the European context. Additional fl exibility in the fi eld of the EU system of 
exceptions and limitations is indispensable. Current problem areas in which 
the EU limitation infrastructure fails to provide suffi  cient breathing space have 
already been pointed out above: the online dissemination of digitized orphan 
works170 and the remix of protected material by amateur creators off ering user-
generated content.171 Th e roots of the problem, however, lie much deeper. As also 
indicated above, the grant of exclusive rights in literary and artistic works must 
be reconciled with fundamental freedoms, particularly freedom of expression 
and information. From an economic perspective, it can be added that copyright 
169 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 20 October 1995, NJ 1996, no. 682 (Dior v. Evora), para. 3.6.2.
170 As to the problem of orphan works in European copyright systems, see M. Elferink, A. Ringnalda, 
Digitale ontsluiting van historische archieven en verweesde werken, Amstelveen: deLex 2009; S. van 
Gompel, ‘Unlocking the Potential of Pre-Existing Content: How to Address the Issue of Orphan 
Works in Europe?’, IIC 38 (2007), p. 669; M.R.F. Senft leben, ‘Pacman forever – preservering van 
computergames’, AMI 2009, p. 221.
171 As to the importance of breathing space for user-generated content, see OECD, ‘Participative Web: 
User-Created Content’; Lee, ‘Warming Up to User-Generated Content’, p. 1459; Knopp, ‘Fanfi ction’, p. 
28; Helberger/Guibault/Janssen/van Eijk/Angelopoulos/van Hoboken, Legal Aspects of User Created 
Content.
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monopolies, while spurring investment in new information products, also 
impede cultural follow-on innovation requiring the use of pre-existing, protected 
material.172 A copyright system seeking to support the cultural innovation cycle 
must provide for both rights broad enough to spur investment and creativity, 
and limitations broad enough to provide suffi  cient breathing space for freedom 
of expression and information.173 
With regard to the maintenance of this balance, an open-ended fair use defence 
has a crucial role to play. In advanced copyright protection systems off ering 
fl exible, broad exclusive rights, such as the EU system, it is wise to employ fair 
use as a counterbalance. In this way, the risk of counterproductive overprotection 
can be minimized. On the basis of an elastic fair use test, the courts can keep the 
broad grant of protection within reasonable limits and inhibit exclusive rights 
from unduly curtailing competing fundamental freedoms. Accordingly, the fair 
use discussion raises the fundamental question of appropriate balancing tools 
within the copyright system. Flexible rights necessitate fl exible limitations. Th is 
becomes obvious in times of new technological developments that impact on the 
copyright system. In these times of change, broad exclusive rights are likely to 
absorb and restrict new possibilities of use even though this may be undesirable 
from the perspective of social, cultural or economic needs.174 In this situation, 
fl exible fair use factors ensure a fast reaction. Th ey allow the courts to re-establish 
a proper balance between freedom and protection. A closed system of narrowly 
defi ned limitations, by contrast, is likely to react too slowly to unforeseen 
challenges. It requires the intervention of the legislator and the development of 
new, specifi c exceptions. Th is process of lawmaking can hardly keep pace with 
rapid technological advances. As a result, the balance between freedom and 
protection will be lost.
Admittedly, the central advantage of fl exibility that is inherent in fair use 
legislation may imply the risk of legal uncertainty. Given the experiences in the 
US, however, the validity of this counterargument is doubtful in the light of the 
172 Cf. W.N. Landes, R.A. Posner, Th e Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, Harvard: Harvard 
University Press 2003. With regard to copyright law, see from the same authors: W.N. Landes, R.A. 
Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’, Th e Journal of Legal Studies 18 (1989), p. 325.
173 Cf. Senft leben, ‘Der kulturelle Imperativ des Urheberrechts’; Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox.
174 With regard to the critical assessment of broad intellectual property protection, see G. Mazziotti, EU 
Digital Copyright Law and the End-User, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer 2008; O. Depenheuer, K.N. Peifer 
(eds), Geistiges Eigentum: Schutzrecht oder Ausbeutungstitel?, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer 2008; R.M. 
Hilty, ‘Sündenbock Urheberrecht?’, in: A. Ohly, D. Klippel (eds), Geistiges Eigentum und Gemeinfreiheit, 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2007, p. 111; R.M. Hilty, A. Peukert, Interessenausgleich im Urheberrecht, Baden-
Baden: Nomos 2004; C. Geiger, Droit d’auteur et droit du public à l’information, approche de droit 
comparé, Paris: Litec 2004 ; D. Kröger, Informationsfreiheit und Urheberrecht, München: C.H. Beck 2002; 
Th . Hoeren, ‘Urheberrecht in der Informationsgesellschaft ’, GRUR 1997, p. 866. 
390
Martin R.F. Senft leben
wealth of established case law that has been accumulated over time.175 Considering 
the decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in Dior v. Evora, the 
counterargument is doubtful also in a continental-European context because 
the fair use solution developed by the Court rests on the use of long-standing 
statutory exceptions as a basis for the identifi cation of further use privileges. 
Again, a suffi  cient degree of legal certainty can easily be secured because the 
identifi cation of further, comparable cases of fair use takes place in line with the 
established system of long-standing statutory exceptions and the accompanying 
case law. 
Th e assertion of insuffi  cient legal certainty, therefore, can be unmasked as 
a strategic argument that off ers advocates of restrictively delineated exceptions 
the opportunity to present traditional continental-European systems as shining 
examples of legal certainty. In this line of reasoning, the detailed defi nition of 
limitations in continental-European copyright legislation clearly indicates the 
scope of permitted unauthorized use, and makes court decisions foreseeable 
– even in the digital environment.176 Proponents of the traditional continental-
European approach to copyright exceptions, however, overlook that in the present 
EU system of exceptions and limitations, the alleged advantage of enhanced legal 
certainty is beyond reach anyway. Because of its dysfunctional architecture, the 
current EU system of exceptions and limitations provides neither legal certainty 
nor suffi  cient fl exibility.
In the Information Society Directive, Article 5 sets forth a closed catalogue of 
exceptions. As indicated above, the listed exceptions are subject to the EU three-
step test that was modelled on corresponding international provisions in Articles 
9(2) BC, 13 TRIPS and 10 WCT.177 Th e interplay between the two components – 
the closed catalogue and the open three-step test – is regulated as follows:
175 Cf. the analysis of the current state of the US fair use doctrine by P. Samuelson, ‘Unbundling Fair Uses’, 
77 Fordham Law Review 2537 (2009); B. Beebe, ‘An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 
1978-2005’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 549 (2008), p. 156; P.N. Leval, ‘Toward a Fair Use 
Standard’, Harvard Law Review 103 (1990), p. 1105; J. Litman, ‘Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s 
Image’, University of Dayton Law Review 22 (1997), p. 588. For critical comments on the predictability 
and consistency of US fair use decisions, see D. Nimmer, ‘“Fairest of Th em All” and Other Fairy Tales 
of Fair Use’, Duke University Law Journal 66 (2003), p. 263; A. Förster, Fair Use, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 
2008, p. 197-201.
176 Th is line of argument has been invoked recently, for instance, by A. Lucas, ‘For a Reasonable 
Interpretation of the Th ree-Step Test’, EIPR 2010, p. 277 (282).
177 As to the draft ing history of this hybrid framework for copyright exceptions, see M. Hart, ‘Th e Proposed 
Directive for Copyright in the Information Society: Nice Rights, Shame about the Exceptions’, EIPR 1998, 
p. 169; Hugenholtz, ‘Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid’, p. 499; D.J.G. 
Visser, ‘De beperkingen in de Auteursrechtrichtlijn’, AMI 2001, p. 9; F. Bayreuther, ‘Beschränkungen des 
Urheberrechts nach der neuen EU-Urheberrechtsrichtlinie’, Zeitschrift  für Urheber- und Medienrecht 
2001, p. 828; Reinbothe, ‘Die EG-Richtlinie zum Urheberrecht in der Informationsgesellschaft ’, p. 733.
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Th e exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 
shall only be applied in certain special cases which do not confl ict with 
a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.178
Th is approach, inevitably, leads to a dilemma. As discussed, a closed list of 
precisely defi ned exceptions, if anything, has the advantage of enhanced legal 
certainty.179 Th is potential advantage, however, is unattainable under the current 
EU system. If national legislators adopt and further specify exceptions from 
the EU catalogue, these specifi c national exceptions may still be challenged on 
the grounds that they are incompatible with the EU three-step test. In other 
words, national exceptions that are already embedded in an infl exible national 
framework may further be restricted by invoking the three-step test. On the 
one hand, national copyright exceptions are thus straitjacketed. Th eir validity 
is hanging by the thread of compliance with the abstract criteria of the EU 
three-step test. On the other hand, the test itself may only be invoked to further 
restrict national exceptions. Unlike fair use provisions with comparable abstract 
criteria, it cannot be employed by the courts to create new, additional forms 
of permitted unauthorized use. Hence, it is impossible to realize the central 
advantage of fl exibility that is inherent in open norms, such as the US fair use 
doctrine.180 
In consequence, the current EU system fails to provide any advantage that 
may follow from the continental-European or the Anglo-American approach to 
copyright limitations. It does not off er suffi  cient legal certainty because precisely 
defi ned national exceptions may still be declared inapplicable in the light of the 
EU three-step test. It also fails to off er suffi  cient fl exibility because the open-
ended, abstract criteria in place – embodied in the three-step test – are deprived 
of the function to serve as a basis for the identifi cation of new types of permissible 
unauthorized use. Instead, the two disadvantages of the Anglo-American and 
the continental-European approach – infl exibility and legal uncertainty – are 
combined. When it is further considered that, as pointed out above, the legislative 
178 Article 5(5) of the Information Society Directive.
179 Cf. Cohen Jehoram, ‘Fair use – die ferne Geliebte’, p. 174; Cohen Jehoram, ‘Implementatie van de 
Auteursrechtrichtlijn’, p. 1690; Cohen Jehoram, ‘Restrictions on Copyright and their Abuse’, p. 359; Lucas, 
‘For a Reasonable Interpretation of the Th ree-Step Test’, p. 277.
180 Cf. Senft leben, ‘Fair Use in the Netherlands – a Renaissance?’, p. 1; J. Griffi  ths, ‘Th e “Th ree-Step Test” 
in European Copyright Law – Problems and Solutions’, Intellectual Property Quarterly 2009, p. 489 
(495), online available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1476968; C. Geiger, ‘Th e Th ree-Step Test, a Th reat 
to a Balanced Copyright Law?’, IIC 37 (2006), p. 683; K.J. Koelman, ‘De nationale driestappentoets’, AMI 
2003, p. 6.
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process required for the amendment of the EU catalogue of exceptions is much 
longer than in the case of national copyright systems, it becomes clear that the 
system of exceptions and limitations in the EU is in a lamentable state. It could 
hardly be more dysfunctional than it is in its present form.
Considering this dilemma, important lessons can be learned from the fair use 
debate in the Netherlands. As explained, the strategy adopted by the Supreme 
Court of the Netherlands in Dior v. Evora for opening up the closed catalogue 
of exceptions in the Dutch Copyright Act consisted of the use of long-standing 
Dutch statutory exceptions as model provisions for the creation of new use 
privileges. Within the EU system, the role of model provisions could easily be 
fulfi lled by the permissible exceptions enumerated in Article 5 of the Information 
Society Directive. Th ese exceptions refl ect copyright limitations that had evolved 
in EU member states prior to the adoption of the Directive.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands pointed out in Dior v. 
Evora that the creation of new use privileges was only possible as long as the 
new exception would fi t in the general system of the law. In the EU system, the 
function of a yardstick for compliance with the general system of harmonized 
EU copyright law could be fulfi lled by the three-step test. To render the test 
capable of accomplishing this function, however, its present straitjacketing eff ect 
would have to be avoided. Th e function of the EU three-step test would have to 
be brought in line with the fundamentally diff erent role played by the three-step 
test at the international level. 
In international copyright law, there can be little doubt that the three-step 
test does not only serve the purpose of restricting national exceptions and 
limitations. At the 1967 Stockholm Conference for the Revision of the Berne 
Convention, the fi rst three-step test in international copyright law was devised as 
a fl exible framework, within which national legislators would enjoy the freedom 
of safeguarding national limitations and satisfying domestic social, cultural, 
and economic needs.181 Th e provision was intended to serve as a basis for the 
adoption of those copyright limitations at the national level which the domestic 
181 See Doc. S/1, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm June 11 to July 14, 1967, Geneva: 
WIPO 1971, p. 81. For a discussion of the breathing space off ered by the three-step test, see A. Kur, ‘Of 
Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water – How Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations Under the Th ree-
Step Test?’, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper Series 
No. 08-04 (2008), available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317707; S. Ricketson, Th e three-step 
test, deemed quantities, libraries, and closed exceptions, Centre for Copyright Studies 2003; Senft leben, 
Copyright, Limitations and the Th ree-Step Test. For a proposal to use the three-step test as an instrument 
to delineate the exclusive rights of copyright owners, see D. Gervais, ‘Toward a New Core International 
Copyright Norm: Th e Reverse Th ree-Step Test’, Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 9 (2005), p. 
1.
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policymakers deemed necessary in the light of the individual needs of the country 
concerned. Accordingly, Article 9(2) BC off ers national lawmakers the freedom 
to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided 
that such reproduction does not confl ict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author. 
Many use privileges that have become widespread in EU member states are directly 
based on the international three-step test. A specifi c provision that permits the 
introduction of national exceptions for private copying, for instance, is sought 
in vain in international copyright law. It is the international three-step test that 
creates breathing space for the adoption of this copyright limitation at the national 
level. Further examples of EU exceptions resting on the international three-step 
test can easily be found in the Information Society Directive: the exemption 
of use for scientifi c research purposes; use privileges for libraries, educational 
establishments, museums and archives; the exemption of reproductions that are 
required for administrative, parliamentary or judicial proceedings; the exemption 
of reproductions made by hospitals and prisons.182 Th e international three-step 
test, therefore, clearly has the function of creating room for the introduction of 
copyright limitations at the national (or regional) level. Th e EU availed itself of 
this enabling function in the context of the Information Society Directive.
With the transposition of this enabling function of the international three-
step test into EU copyright law, an EU fair use doctrine could be established by 
modifying Article 5(5) of the Information Society Directive as follows:
In certain special cases comparable to those refl ected by the exceptions 
and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, the use of works 
or other subject-matter may also be exempted from the rights provided for 
in Articles 2 and 3, provided that such use does not confl ict with a normal 
exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and does not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.183
182 Cf. Articles 5(3)(a), 5(3)(e), 5(2)(c) and 5(3)(n), 5(2)(e) of the Information Society Directive. As far as the 
right of reproduction is aff ected by these exceptions, they rest on the three-step test in Article 9(2) BC. 
With regard to the right of making available to the public, they rest on the three-step test in Article 10(1) 
WCT. For a more detailed description of the enabling function of the international three-step test, see 
Senft leben, Copyright, Limitations and the Th ree-Step Test, p. 118-121. 
183 Th is proposal is in line with Article 5.5 of the European Copyright Code that is the result of the 
Wittem Project that was established in 2002 as a collaboration between copyright scholars across the 
European Union concerned with the future development of European copyright law. Th e proposed 
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Under this proposal, the exceptions currently enumerated in Article 5 of the 
Information Society Directive would remain unchanged. As in the Dutch Dior 
v. Evora decision, however, these exceptions could serve as a reference point for 
the identifi cation of further cases of permissible unauthorized use on the basis of 
the EU three-step test that would have been aligned with the enabling function 
fulfi lled by the three-step test at the international level. As required in Dior v. 
Evora, this approach implies that these further cases would have to be comparable 
with those refl ected by the exceptions enumerated in Article 5, for instance, in 
the sense that they served comparable purposes or were justifi ed by comparable 
policies. 
Recalibrating the interplay between the catalogue of permissible exceptions 
and the open-ended three-step test in this way, the proposed EU fair use provision 
inspired by the Dutch Dior v. Evora judgment would also ensure that the current 
dysfunctional system – no fl exibility, no legal certainty – is transformed into a 
consistent system attaining both objectives. Suffi  cient fl exibility would result from 
the use of the three-step test as an opening clause that would allow the courts to 
further develop the EU limitation infrastructure by devising new exceptions on 
the basis of the prototypes listed in Article 5 of the Information Society Directive.
Furthermore, the change in the use of the three-step test would enhance the 
degree of legal certainty provided by the EU system. Th e proposed redefi nition of 
the three-step test would prevent the courts from employing the test as a means 
to place additional constraints on statutory exceptions that are defi ned precisely 
in national legislation. By contrast, the abstract criteria of the test would serve 
the purpose of devising new exceptions. Th ey would no longer be available as 
an additional control mechanism and a straitjacket of narrowly circumscribed 
national exceptions. As a result, the legal certainty resulting from the precise 
defi nition of use privileges at the national level could no longer be eroded 
through the additional application of the open-ended EU three-step test. In case 
of precisely defi ned national exceptions, users of copyrighted material could rely 
on the scope following from the wording of the respective national provisions. 
Th ere would be no need to speculate on the outcome of an additional scrutiny 
in the light of the three-step test that makes it diffi  cult to foresee the exception’s 
defi nite ambit of operation.
When compared with the lamentable current state of the regulation of 
copyright exceptions in the EU, the adoption of the proposed fair use provision 
inspired by the Dutch Dior v. Evora decision would thus improve the limitation 
infrastructure substantially. Instead of minimizing both fl exibility and legal 
European Copyright Code of the Wittem Project is available online at www.copyrightcode.eu.
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certainty, the proposed use of the exceptions listed in Article 5 of the Information 
Society Directive as model provisions for the identifi cation of further cases of 
permissible fair use, and the redefi nition of the EU three-step test in line with 
the enabling function fulfi lled by the international three-step test, would ensure 
suffi  cient fl exibility to cope with the challenges of the rapid development of the 
Internet and, at the same time, enhance the degree of legal certainty that can be 
achieved on the basis of a precise defi nition of exceptions.
5. Conclusion and future developments
Th e analysis of the evolution of the right of quotation, the exemption of parody 
and the debate on fair use under the Dutch Copyright Act yields important 
insights into a national legal tradition that can off er important impulses for the 
further development of European and international copyright law. On balance, 
the evolution of Dutch standards with regard to quotations, parody and fair use 
can be described as a process of gradual broadening of use privileges in the light 
of the need to counterbalance exclusive rights that have constantly been expanded 
during the last 100 years. Considering the more recent past, the broadening of use 
privileges in the area of quotations, parody and fair use can also be described as a 
reaction to challenges in the digital environment, in particular the need to ensure 
suffi  cient breathing space for freedom of expression and information. Th ese more 
recent developments can be placed in the context of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
permitting Contracting Parties
...to carry forward and appropriately extend into the digital environment 
limitations and exceptions in their national laws which have been 
considered acceptable under the Berne Convention.184 
and also permitting Contracting Parties
...to devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital 
network environment.185 
While the broadening of use privileges for quotations, parody and other fair 
transformations of existing material as such may not be surprising in the light 
of these international guidelines, it is remarkable how Dutch legislation used the 
184 Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty. 
185 Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty. 
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breathing space available under the EU Information Society Directive for this 
purpose.
With regard to the right of quotation, the implementation of the Information 
Society Directive into Dutch copyright law led to the attenuation of the 
traditional context requirement confi ning the scope of the quotation right to 
use in an ‘announcement, review, polemic discussion or scientifi c treatise’. Th e 
relaxation of this context requirement was based on the fact that Article 5(3)
(d) of the Directive covers quotations for purposes ‘such as’ criticism or review. 
As the words ‘such as’ indicate that criticism and review are only examples of 
permissible quotation purposes, the Dutch quotation right was extended to use 
for purposes ‘comparable’ to the traditional cases of announcement, review etc. 
With this relaxation of the context requirement, Dutch legislation paved the 
way for court decisions in which the broadened quotation right was applied to 
online search results generated on the basis of an automated process of collecting 
and indexing information available on the Internet. In this way, search results 
of advanced search engines, such as image search engines, were brought within 
the scope of the right of quotation in the Netherlands. Considering the problems 
that have arisen in EU member states with more limited quotation rights, such as 
Germany and France, this development is of particular importance. It shows that 
breathing space for advanced search engine services can be created within the 
closed catalogue of permissible exceptions in Article 5 of the Information Society 
Directive. Th is is more consistent and satisfactory than artifi cial assumptions 
relating to implicit consent and the safe harbour for hosting that had to be used 
in Germany and France to invent around the overly restrictive national quotation 
right recognized in these EU member states.
In the area of parody, Dutch legislation followed a two-tiered approach to off er 
suffi  cient breathing space. Th e traditional exemption of parodies constituting a 
‘new, original work’ in the sense of the Dutch free adaptation rule was retained 
when implementing the Information Society Directive. Th is decision can be 
understood to indicate that the Directive, even though providing explicitly for a 
parody exception in Article 5(3)(k), does not harmonize the right of adaptation. 
Th e Dutch lawmaker, therefore, was free to maintain the traditional ‘new, original 
work’ exemption. Similar decisions have been taken in other EU member states 
with comparable free adaptation rules. In Germany, for instance, the traditional 
‘independent work’ exemption was also upheld under the Information Society 
Directive. Dutch legislation, however, also implemented the parody exception laid 
down in Article 5(3)(k) of the Directive. In this way, the traditional free adaptation 
rule was supplemented with an explicit parody exception that can be understood 
to extend the breathing space for parodies to cases where features of the original 
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work reappear in the parody to such an extent that the latter amounts to an act 
of reproduction. As in the case of the right of quotation, the implementation of 
the Information Society Directive, therefore, led to the broadening of the room 
available for parodies in Dutch copyright law. Under the new parody exception, 
Dutch courts attach particular importance to the contrast with the original work 
that is created through diff erent contexts chosen for the parody.186 Th is approach 
increases the room for parody when compared with the test whether the parody 
includes more features from the original work than necessary for identifying the 
target of the mockery. Th is test was applied prior to the implementation of the 
Information Society Directive.187 
With regard to the adoption of an open-ended fair use doctrine, the Dutch 
legal tradition is of particular interest because the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands, in its 1995 Dior v. Evora decision, opened up the closed catalogue 
of exceptions in the Dutch Copyright Act. Th e Court acknowledged that there 
was a possibility of using existing exceptions in the Dutch Copyright Act as a 
model for the creation of new exceptions. On the basis of a comparable balancing 
of interests, gaps in the limitation infrastructure could be fi lled as long as the 
envisaged new use privilege was in line with the Dutch system of exceptions.188 
Instead of relying on abstract factors, this fair use approach is based on the 
use of existing, narrowly circumscribed statutory exceptions as prototypes for 
the identifi cation of further use privileges. Although the exception prototypes 
in Article 5 of the Information Society Directive may be used in a comparable 
way to create additional fl exibility,189 the Dutch lawmaker did not follow this 
strategy during the implementation of the Directive. Nonetheless, the discussion 
about fair use continued in the Netherlands. As a result, the Dutch Government 
announced initiatives to commence a debate on the adoption of a fair use clause 
at the European level.190 Th e conviction that the closed catalogue of copyright 
exceptions should be opened up thus survived in the Netherlands. In potential 
future debates on fair use at the European level, the Dior v. Evora decision of the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands constitutes an important precedent. Th e fair 
186 For instance, the contrast resulting from the parody was emphasized by J.H. Spoor, D.W.F. Verkade, 
D.J.G. Visser already in the fi rst edition of Auteursrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 1985, p. 114-115.
187 Cf. M. de Cock-Buning, ‘De parodie-exceptie nader beschouwd’, in: F.W. Grosheide (ed.), Parodie – 
parodie en kunstcitaat, Th e Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2006, p. 103 (105-119).
188 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 20 October 1995, NJ 1996, no. 682 (Dior v. Evora), para. 3.6.2.
189 Cf. Senft leben, Copyright, Limitations and the Th ree-Step Test, p. 264-268 and 278-281; Hugenholtz/
Senft leben, Fair Use in Europe, p. 17-18.
190 See the offi  cial government letter to the parliament in which the Dutch Government explains its plans 
and objectives in the fi eld of copyright law, Speerpuntenbrief auteursrecht 20@20, Tweede Kamer 2010-
2011, 29 838, nr. 29, online available at www.ie-forum.nl, no. 9541, p. 13.
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use solution developed by the Court – the use of existing exceptions as a reference 
point for the identifi cation of further use privileges – could be introduced in EU 
copyright law, for instance, by recalibrating the three-step test of Article 5(5) of 
the Directive. Instead of serving as a means of scrutinizing national limitations 
and exceptions that are circumscribed narrowly anyway, the open-ended criteria 
of the three-step test should be used as guidelines for the identifi cation of new 
use privileges in the light of existing statutory exceptions.191 In this way, the 
functioning of the EU three-step test could be brought in line with the role played 
by the three-step test at the international level.
In all three areas analysed in the present inquiry – quotations, parody and fair 
use – important lessons can thus be learned from developments that took place 
under the 1912 Dutch Copyright Act. In particular, the analysis yields the basic 
insight that fl exible rights in the fi eld of copyright law require fl exible limitations 
as a counterbalance. Th ere are strong indications that the strategies applied in the 
Netherlands to secure this balance during the last 100 years could be put to good 
use in the EU and at the international level.192
191 Cf. Senft leben, ‘Th e International Th ree-Step Test: A Model Provision for EC Fair Use Legislation’, p. 67. 
Th is proposal is in line with Article 5.5 of the European Copyright Code that is the result of the Wittem 
Project that was established in 2002 as a collaboration between copyright scholars across the European 
Union concerned with the future development of European copyright law. Th e proposed European 
Copyright Code of the Wittem Project is available online at www.copyrightcode.eu.
192 With regard to WIPO initiatives in the area of copyright limitations, see S. Dusollier, Scoping Study on 
Copyright and Related Rights and the Public Domain, WIPO Document CDIP/4/3/Rev./Study/INF/1, 
dated 7 May 2010, Geneva: WIPO 2010. For specifi c studies, see the overview provided in document 
SCCR/20/4. With regard to educational activities, see documents SCCR/19/4 (Monroy Study), SCCR/19/5 
(Fometeu Study), SCCR/19/6 (Nabhan Study), SCCR/19/7 (Seng Study), SCCR/19/8 (Xalabarder Study). 
As to the debate on exceptions and limitations for educational activities and practices and measures 
for the benefi t of persons with print disabilities, see documents SCCR/20/3 and SCCR/20/5. Th e WIPO 
documents are available online at www.wipo.int. Cf. N.W. Netanel (ed.), Th e Development Agenda: 
Global Intellectual Property and Developing Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007.
